



IQBAL REVIEW


Journal of the Iqbal Academy Pakistan

APRIL, 1961

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IQBAL REVIEW

Journal of the Iqbal Academy, Pakistan

THE Journal is devoted to research studies on the life, poetry and thought of Iqbal and publishes articles which explain, elucidate, or develop Iqbal's ideas on politics, ethics, education, history, economics, philosophy, sociology, psychology, literature, art, comparative religion, Islamics, etc., or otherwise deal with subjects in which Iqbal was interested.

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
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
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IQBAL AS A PHILOSOPHER-POET

A. K. Brohi.

All great men live historically with us after they have ceased to live biologically: we share their thoughts and give to their life's work a setting in which it continues to fulfil the very tasks which they had set before themselves to accomplish. If we want to maintain the high resolve of being worthy successors of the great tradition that the Faith of Muhammad and the labour of those who have worked in the cause of its propagation and realisation have built for us to draw our inspiration from, we cannot do better than by maintaining a sense of our kinship and continuity with these mighty figures of the past, thereby consciously participating in the making of Muslim history and giving to it the impetus it needs for the progressive realisation of its cultural potential, and for the propagation of its liberating influence for the benefit of mankind at large.

And Iqbal is significant to us precisely because nobody has served more than he has the cause of Islam—he is, for us, the mouthpiece of Muslim destiny as it articulates itself in our own day. It is a measure of his greatness that he reflected in his poetry as even in his philosophy, an attitude of a mind that was typically Muslim; and he has succeeded, as no one has succeeded before him in the recent past, in imparting to our history that vital touch which has been responsible for invigorating and enlivening it, and in a highly significant sense, for giving to it the direction it needed for enabling the Muslims all over the world in general and of the Indo-Pakistan sub-continent in particular, to fulfil their historical role of meeting the challenge that has come to them from the West. When the history of our times comes to be written by an impartial student of human affairs, I am



sure it will be to the influence of Iqbal more than to any other single factor that he will attribute the awakening that the Muslims of India have experienced—an awakening which, in its turn, has been responsible for the very creation of the State of Pakistan itself. It is to his poetry that we owe the moral and intellectual regeneration of the Mussalmans of the mid-twentieth century. If the best thing we can get out of any man is the sense of general enthusiasm that his life's work arouses in us, we will be well within our right to put it down to the credit of Iqbal the typical pride that we all take in our being Muslims, and we have reason to be grateful to him for his having so everlastingly enriched our cultural heritage by the powerful and magnificent creations of his poetic imagination and philosophic contemplation.

To my way of thought Iqbal is a triumphant missionary in the cause of Islam; he is a warrior in the cause of the political liberation of the Mussalmans of the Indo-Pakistan sub-Continent, and above all, he is that high priest of humanity who has incited us, in words that cannot be improved upon, to give to the world the best that the Religion of Islam has to offer.

There have been, to be sure, much greater figures in the total range of Muslim history than Iqbal; but, I submit, the supreme importance of his example for us is to be traced to the fact that he is so near to us in terms of time: he has articulated for us the fundamental spirit of Islam in the very vernacular of the age in which we live. For every cultivated and civilised man Iqbal's thought possesses an everlasting value, but to the Mussalmans in particular it conveys a kind of significance that is vastly more important—his poetry and his thought epitomise for them a 20th century manifesto of what Islam has to offer for the solution of those perplexing problems with which they are daily being confronted.

If it be true, as Doctor Martin Luther teaches us to believe, that the world is ruled by God through a few *heroes* and *pre-eminent persons*, we would like to find out the credentials by which the claim of these heroes and pre-eminent persons to rule the world can be

recognised. And, therefore, the all-important question to answer is: who are these heroes and how shall we identify them? I suggest that it is only by the impact they and their teaching makes on History that we can discover who the *real* rulers of this world are. And the whole human history, I submit, attests the truth of the thesis that "the mightiest of these ruling heroes are the princes of *intellect*, men who without sanction of diplomacy or force of arms, without the constraining power of law and police, exercise a defining and transforming influence upon the thought and feeling of many generations, men who may be said to be all the more powerful, the less power they have, but who seldom, perhaps never, ascend their throne during their life-time; their sway lasts long but begins late, often very late, especially when we leave out of account the influence which they exercise upon the individuals and consider the moment when that which filled their life begins to affect and mould the life of the *whole* peoples."¹ All strength is acquired by Man, thanks only to the forces of righteousness, and it is durable only on a moral basis. And nothing makes for moral outlook or for the dispensation of justice more than the gift of knowledge radiated by clarity of thought. He who sneers at the servant and prides himself on his brute strength is undermining his own authority to rule, to say nothing of the fact that he is running counter to the total current of Human History and plotting against the very life of mankind.

And for a grateful Nation that is Pakistan, Iqbal is the Hero—and it is he who continues to rule it. It is in this sense that he continues to live. The moment we awaken to a consciousness of the freely exercised creative power which is embedded, embalmed and treasured in his verse we cross a definite boundary of existence and begin to live a larger life. Endowed with such a consciousness a man becomes a decisive force in History, and indeed a new element in the Cosmos. It is in this sense that Schiller has to be understood when he said,

1. Chamberlain, H.C., *Foundations of Nineteenth Century*, p. 3.

"Nature has formed *creatures* only, but *art* has made *men*." Schiller goes on further to explain the point of this aphorism as follows:

"Nature does not make a better beginning with man than with other works; She acts for him while he cannot yet act for himself as a free intelligent being. But what precisely makes him a man is the fact that he does not stand still as mere Nature made him, but is endowed with the capacity of retracing with the aid of Reason the steps which Nature anticipated with him, of transforming the work of Necessity into a work of his free choice and of raising the physical Necessity to a moral one."

This conflict between Man and Nature is the never-ending refrain of Occidental Philosophy and there is a sense in which it is permissible to look at the relationship between the two in the way Schiller looks at it. But Islam has taught us to transcend the grammar of this encounter and who has helped us to understand the point of the Qur'anic Teaching on this subject more than Iqbal himself?

Commenting on the well-known line in the Qur'an that the Soul proceedeth from my Lord's *Amr*,² (which he translates as "Command") Iqbal goes on to point out:

"In order to understand the meaning of the word 'Amr', we must remember the distinction which the Qur'an draws between 'Amr' and 'Khalq'. Pringle-Pattison deplors that the English language possesses only one word—'creation'—to express the relation of God and the Universe of extension on the one hand, and the relation of God and the human ego on the other. The Arabic language, however, is more fortunate in this respect. It has two words 'Khalq' and 'Amr' to express the two ways in which the creative activity of God reveals itself to us. 'Khalq' is creation; 'Amr' is direction. As the Qur'an says: 'To Him belong creation and direction.' The verse quoted above means that the essential nature of the soul is directive, as it proceeds from the directive energy of God; though we do not know how

2. Al-Qur'an: xvii:85

Divine 'Amr' functions as ego-unities. The personal pronoun used in the expression *Rabbi* (My Lord) throws further light on the nature and behaviour of the ego. It is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as something individual and specific, with all the variations in the range, balance, and effectiveness of its unity. 'Every man acteth after his own manner: but your Lord well knoweth who is best guided in his path.' (xvii:84). Thus my real personality is not a thing, it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually referring to one another, and held together by the unity of a directive purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude. You cannot perceive me like a thing in space, or a set of experiences in temporal order; you must interpret, understand and appreciate me in my judgments, in my will-attitudes, aims, and aspiration."

The Qur'an thus does not view Nature and Man in opposition to each other but takes them merely as representing different aspects of one and the same Divine Will.

I do not, however, agree that the word *Amr* means the same thing as 'command'—for to say that would mean that Nature does not come to be or exist in obedience to God's command. The world of *Amr* in my opinion is the world of significance, of meaning; and represents from man's point of view the inward movement of God's creative power. What issues forth as a result of God's *command* "Be" is both 'creation' and 'significance'—only for man, such is the mechanism of his perception, the process acquires a dual complexion with the result that his intellect separates the indivisible creative process into two: (a) the world of matter, of Necessity, on the one hand and (b) the world of Spirit and of Freedom, on the other. In order that Man should escape this mode of viewing Reality he has to become more *conscious* of the true ground of his being, and then it is that he escapes the law of mechanical necessity which rules Nature and gets anchored in the world of Spirit and of Freedom. Regarded in the abstract, Man is both Nature and Spirit—but it

depends on him *where* he wants to take roots. That is where his fundamental Freedom is to be found!

(II)

His Art and Poetry

There is a general belief prevalent even with those who ought to know better, *viz.*, that *Islam does not set much value on art in general and poetry in particular*. One fails to understand the reasons that have contributed to the maintenance of this crude belief. God describes Himself in the Qur'an as an Artist (*Mussawir*) and there is a general invitation extended to every man to incarnate in himself the attributes of God. It is true that in the *Surah* of the Qur'an which is entitled "*The Poets*"³, the vocation of a poet has been sharply contrasted with the one pursued by the Prophet. But this emphasis on discrimination was necessary in view of the fact that, by and large, there does exist a type of poetry which is not better than an irresponsible utterance, and, what is more, the life of the poet does not as a rule minister to the ideal of righteousness. There was the general charge urged against the Prophet by those who were the detractors from his mission that he was no better than a poet and that the verses of the Qur'an had no higher value than that which could be predicated of the verses of an ordinary poet. This charge had therefore to be expressly repudiated by the Qur'an, because decidedly the role of the Prophet is vastly different from that of a poet and it stands to be considered from another perspective altogether.

It was the role of the Prophet (a) to *purify* his people, (b) to apprise them of their *destiny*; and (c) to teach them *Hikmat* or philosophy: by the very example he gave in his own personal life his followers were expected to practise a life of piety and righteousness. Much of the message of the Qur'an was calculated to secure a total transformation of the life of those who came under its influence. All this is understandable—as also the insistence of the Qur'an that

3. Al-Qur'an, *Surah* XXVI.

the mission of the Prophet had to be carefully distinguished from that of a poet. But from this it cannot be argued that poetry has no place in the scheme of things and that deliverances of poetic consciousness are to be roundly denounced by all and sundry as being arbitrary and irrelevant. The whole Muslim tradition runs counter to this type of thinking and the cultural history of Islam presents to us poetry of a very high order written by poets were also men of the very highest calibre.

Poets are the law-givers of the world: they are the men who are endowed with a sort of sixth sense by reason of which they are able to see more into the nature of things. They are gifted with what we call "vision". They, by their utterances, have lubricated the rough gears of life and have saved society from the wasteful friction which is involved in its members living unaesthetic lives. It is for this reason that the Arabs used to celebrate only *two important events in the life of the nation*: one of these was the *birth of a swift horse* and the other, the *birth of a poet*. There is also the well-known Arab saying which points out that the best place for man is the saddle of a swift horse and best friend for man is the book. There appears to be something common which had linked up the two symbols, that of the horse and the poet, in the minds of the Arabs: the one enabled them to cover enormous distances in the shortest possible time and the other enabled them, in their imagination at least, to glance from Earth to Heaven and Heaven to Earth and thus cover the entire range of human experience in relation to the boundless universe in which our lives are cast.

Human history shows to us the supreme importance of the role which men of vision play in the lives of nations: people are known to have perished merely because no men of vision or imagination came to live amongst them. There is a saying of the Prophet which shows that it is the tongues of the poets that furnish to us the keys with which we are to unlock the secret treasures that are to be found in the Universe.

It is necessary to point out that Islam has been responsible for

the evolution of the art of poetry along lines that are radically different from those that were pursued before its advent. There was no such thing as romantic poetry, or romantic music or romantic literature before the birth of Islam. All art forms of antiquity were retained by Muslim poets but with them their application had to subserve other purposes. Iqbal's Poetry, for instance, represents the high-water mark of the reach of this evolution. He is essentially a poet of the idea in the sense that he uses the gift of poetry in the service of setting forth a view of Man and his place in the scheme of things, that is, as a means for articulating those fundamental and basic truths without which a man cannot feel at home in this universe. It is for this reason that some have found it difficult to draw a line where Iqbal as a poet ends and where Iqbal as a philosopher begins. But this mode of regarding Iqbal's work, I submit, is open to the objection that no such distinction is at all possible in his case.

It is sufficient to emphasise that Iqbal is essentially a poet of another dimension: his essential technique seems to be to fall in love with the idea that appeals to him and then to let that idea issue forth from the profoundest depth of his being. The result is that in the process the expression of that idea gets highly charged with an emotional halo and splendour. In Iqbal's poetry one encounters ideas that are by and large familiar to us: some ideas are taken from the Qur'an, others from Rumi and yet some others from German philosophers of the 19th century. But nevertheless while we read about these ideas in the poetry of Iqbal we are moved by them, and, as if for the first time, begin to notice how powerful their appeal can be. It is not so much the love of the sunset and the dawn, of the seasons, of the flowers or any other tangible object which seems to possess the soul of Iqbal: his poetic fancy seems to be specially designed to fall in love with intangible entities—the ideas, ideals, philosophic truths and convictions. He lets them be reborn in his poetic consciousness before they are articulated poetically. The result of this is the tremendous appeal which the thought-content of his poetry makes upon the mind of a sensitive reader. What is original

with Iqbal is not the ideational-content of his poetry—but the transformation it undergoes as a result of its orientation in his being. That is why, although on logical analysis his poetry could be ranked as “Literature of information”, in reality it is “Literature of power”.

But it is not the function of poetry merely to give to the ideas it articulates the emotional colouring by reason of which the minds of men may be moved: it is also its office to impart to the expression thus attempted a quality of, what Robert Lynd has called, “memorableness”. It is far more easy to *remember* the verses that a poet writes than a statement of the same idea contained in prose, no matter how very elegantly it may have been set forth therein. The reason of this is that the general device of arranging words in rhythmic cadences and rhyme-endings, fastens the content of poetry in a scaffolding which gives to it the appearance of being a compact whole. Our power of recall is greatly assisted if what we are to recall is a significant whole and chimes with the rhythm of our inward being.

Apart from the unusual architectonics inherent in the poetical rendering of the content of the ideas, Iqbal may be regarded as being essentially a transcendental poet from yet another perspective. The scale on which he attempts the poetical theme is so cosmically great that the sympathetic reader for a time at least is able to escape the grip of his narrower consciousness and thus begins to live in a world of the objective and universal truth. Iqbal as a poet has not only the *wealth of expression* and the *depth of feeling*, he has also the *breadth of vision*. When he sings he remains of Earth, earthy no doubt; but when he sings, he also soars: his poetry helps you to follow him in his flights heavenward. He enables you to dart in imagination from one end of the universe to another: he helps you to track down the distant stars and encounter them while they are engaged in careering across their orbital paths during the course of their cosmic hurrying. And when he enters into a dialogue with the angels and the spirits of the immortal figures who have left their marks on our history, he lets you live for a moment at least upon a different plane altogether.

And yet all the while you are with Iqbal in this sense, he lets you feel *earnest* about everything. Instead of dulling the keen edge of your consciousness, he sharpens it so that it can now be used by you as an effective weapon with which to fight those forces of evil and discord which are constantly at war with the harmonies of human life.

(III)

Iqbal the Philosopher

As to Iqbal as a *philosopher*, there is not much that I need say. Such is the equipment of my mind that I understand him far more in his role as a philosopher than as a poet, and it would suffice for a general observation if I were to state about him what could with equal justification be observed about the philosophy of Goethe: his philosophical convictions are not the *result* of any metaphysical meditations on the nature of human experience or the offsprings of his power of rational comprehension of the ground of universe but, so at least it seems to me, his convictions seem to have come to him from a source which is alien to his consciousness. In fact, he gets the philosophical truths ready-made from a source of which he has no understanding; but having got them, he is prepared to look at them *philosophically* and so give to them a *local habitation and a name*. Iqbal is perpetually receiving gifts in the shape of ideas from a source of which he has no awareness, but having received them he is able to assign to them their logical values in the general scheme of a philosophical perspective. That is why he remains so loyal to the cultural tradition in which he has been steeped. With him intellect is not in rebellion against his Extra-Rational convictions: it plays not a *sovereign* but merely a subordinate role in his life. His philosophic outlook has thus been conditioned by the limits of his poetical consciousness. Philosophy with him is not an instrument of discovery of truth but merely of ordering experience, a mode of organising his ideas, of pigeon-holing them, of cataloguing them. He loves order and harmony and is all the time busy in arranging the various toys that he has received as gifts from higher powers in the shape of great ideas. Fundamentally, unless I am mistaken, he

is not possessed of philosophic consciousness at all—at any rate with him philosophical consciousness is not a primary phenomenon. He has a sure instinct for knowing the philosophical truth when he encounters it—but this is with him an innate and not a cultural phenomenon. In my opinion he remains a poet through and through, but occasionally he is seen employing the philosophical method in defining the logical relationships between several insights and intuitions with which he has been favoured by higher powers.

The foregoing opinion of mine may sound somewhat strange, but from my point of view, its strangeness seems to lie in the fact that it is so sound. As I see it, the fundamental difference between poetic consciousness and the philosophic consciousness may be explained analogically thus: a poet is essentially a *feminine* spirit in that he can create only under an alien stimulus—even as the woman can create only under the fecundating influence of her male partner. The greatness and the grandeur of a poetical genius consists in his being able to serve in a spirit of “wise-passiveness” as a vehicle for the communication of that which he himself does not *understand*. Poetic consciousness in the being of Man, functionally considered, may be compared with a telephone wire through which it is somebody else who is to speak. The *wire* has no message to give; it is only a means for the articulation of another man’s voice. This is what is meant by saying that a poet must await the advent of the moment of inspiration when he can create. The philosopher, on the other hand, is a masculine spirit and as the ground of his creativity is in his own being, all the time he is embedded in a layer of consciousness where *nothing is allowed to intrude unless it can be rationally comprehended*. In many ways, therefore, the *reach* of a philosophic consciousness is more limited, for the philosopher by the nature of his mission is pledged to labour under the *feeble light of human knowledge*, which knowledge, as Santayana has described it, is after all only “a torch of a smoky pine which lights but one step ahead”. The dignity and importance of philosophic consciousness, from the point of view of History, consists in its *capacity* for being able to

transfer faithfully its findings for the benefit of all. What is philosophically discovered is capable of being realistically, not merely symbolically, communicated in the oral word and its record can be preserved in a written word for all time to come. The poetic consciousness transfigures reality, whereas the philosophic consciousness is qualified only to interpret objectively facts of human experience in order that enlightened action can be designed: thus it is that it seems as though deliverances of philosophical consciousness were the modern substitutes for the system of *Revealed Truth*: in our day, it is philosophy that furnishes the guidance which it was one time the function of *Revealed Truth* to provide. And so the Prophet was asked to teach his followers *Hikmat*—Philosophy. But he was also asked to first purify them and teach them their Destiny. This is because unless a man is inwardly pure and knows his destiny he cannot very well apply knowledge to the end that he may live well and fruitfully on Earth. For Islam, purity is the first step to spiritual life: with us cleanliness is not next to Godliness—it comes before Godliness can itself become possible. That is why the old commentators of the Qur'an prefaced the Book with the warning "Except that one is pure no one can touch (that is understand) the Book". (*La yamussuhu ill al mutahhroon*).

(IV)

On *Ijtihad*

It now remains for me to refer to the great service that Iqbal has rendered to the world of Islam by the way in which he has taught us to look on *Ijtihad* as the source of Muslim law. So very fundamental is this concept of *Ijtihad* that its proper comprehension by the world of Islam today alone will ensure its survival and enable it to meet the challenge that has come to it in the name of modernity, from the West. The question is how is the law of Islam to be adjusted to the conditions of a fast changing society. What I propose to do is not merely to paraphrase the answer that Iqbal made to this question but also to draw some of the deductions that inevitably seem to follow

from his formulation of the doctrine of *Ijtihad*, deductions which, in my submission, must be drawn and the principle to be deduced therefrom to be applied to redeem the Law of Islam from that creeping paralysis that has overtaken it and has virtually made it immobile and stationary. If it be true that the immortality of a great thinker consists precisely in the posthumous influence which his ideas have on the life of mankind, it must follow that the historical effectualness of the teaching of a great mind must transcend the narrower frame-work in which that teaching was applied by it to tackle the problems as they presented themselves to it. It is in this sense that I propose, in the general scheme of my present undertaking, to draw as clear a picture as I can, of what the Law of Islam would be today if the insight which Iqbal had in regard to *Ijtihad* (which he characterised as the principle of movement in the structure of Islam), be applied to it.

The religious impulse which lies at the back of all Muslim institutions stems from the recognition of the real relationship of man to God; this relationship according to the Qur'an is one of absolute and unconditional obedience of Man to the will of God to such an extent that everything that a man thinks, feels, or does ought to be an aspect of that obedience. No wonder the name of our religion is "Islam" which means submission to the Will of God Who is absolute and all-powerful and with whom no other power shares his sovereignty. This relationship of God to Man may also be likened to the relationship of the General to his soldier; and in fact, one of the greatest of the 20th century philosophers has so viewed it. This is what Keyserling writes in *The Travel Diary of a Philosopher* about the relationship which man has with God, according to the tenets of Islam. He says: Islam is the religion of absolute submission. What Schleiermacher has described as the nature of all religiosity does in fact define that of the Mussalman. He feels himself to be at all times in the absolute power of his divine Master, and, moreover, in his personal power, not in that of his ministers and servants; he always stands face to face with Him. This conditions the democratic

quality of Islam.....When the faithful perform their prayers at fixed hours in the mosque, kneeling there line upon line, when they all go through the same gestures simultaneously, this is not done, as in the case of Hinduism, as a means to self-realisation, but it is done in the spirit in which a Prussian soldier files past his Emperor. This fundamentally military attitude explains all the intrinsic advantages of a Mussalman.

But having paid that tribute to Islam, Keyserling goes on to add, as though it were an inevitable deduction, the following:

"It also explains simultaneously his fundamental failings: his lack of progressiveness, his inadaptability, his lack of inventive power. The soldier only has to obey his orders; the rest is Allah's business."

I am afraid Keyserling cannot very well be blamed for the view he takes of the fundamental failings of the Muslim: *viz.*, his lack of progressiveness, his inadaptability. After all, it meant some courage even for a man of the fame and name of Iqbal to be able to expound the Doctrine of *Ijtihad* as constituting the principle of movement in the structure of Islam. While doing so even he could not help complaining of the rigorous conservation of our Doctors of the Law. He had, however, no doubt "that a deeper study of the enormous legal literature of Islam is sure to rid the modern critic of the superficial opinion that the Law of Islam is stationary and is incapable of development."

It is necessary that we ought to look at this Iqbalian formulation of the "Principle of Movement in the Structure of Islam" somewhat more closely.

Obedience to the Will of God is possible in principle, provided *we know what that Will has ordained*. During the life time of the Prophet it was he who was the channel of communication between God and man, and the revelation that he received is contained in the Qur'an, and the Mussalmans believe that the revelation has been preserved in as pure a form as it was received, and till the very end of time its text will remain unadulterated and uninterpolated. Sup-

plementing the word of the Qur'an are the traditions of the Prophet more generically known as the *Sunnah* of the Prophet—the traditions by themselves being but evidence of that *Sunnah*. These two sources of law exist for every Muslim and it is his duty to strive to discover for himself what they can mean to him in relation to any action that he may be called upon to take with a view to ordering his individual and collective life in the society of which he is a member. In themselves these two sources are incapable of any automatic expansion and their utility to man is available precisely to the extent to which he is prepared to exert his thinking faculties to discover what they can mean to him in order that he be able to design enlightened action to deal with environmental emergencies posed by the ever-changing conditions of society in which his lot is cast.

But a far more important idea is to appreciate the importance of the conception of the finality of Prophethood in the context of the foregoing ideas. No Prophet will ever come to man after Prophet Muhammad (Peace be upon Him), and this is so because the system of Revealed Truth is complete in the Qur'an and it now lies with man to realise that Truth in his own being and so apply its light to discover for himself what he is to do in order to fulfil his mission on Earth. It is in the comprehension of this idea that the writings of Iqbal are of immense assistance to the student of Islam.

We would, in the first place, do well to recall what Iqbal said in his lecture on "*The Spirit of Muslim Culture*" in regard to the necessity of revealed source of Truth during the "minority of mankind". In his words:

"A prophet may be defined as a type of mystic consciousness in which 'unitary experience' tends to overflow its boundaries and seeks opportunity of redirecting or refashioning the forces of collective life. In his personality the finite centre of life sinks into his own infinite depth only to spring up again, with fresh vigour to destroy the old, and to disclose the new directions of life Now during the minority of mankind psychic

energy develops what I call prophetic consciousness—a mode of economizing individual thought and choice by providing ready-made judgments, choices, and ways of action. With the birth of reason and critical faculty, however, life in its own interest, inhibits the formation and growth of non-rational modes of consciousness through which psychic energy flowed at an earlier stage of human evolution.”

Having pointed out the reason why we ought to regard revelation as the basis of Truth, Iqbal proceeds further to show why, after mankind crossed the age of minority, it was no longer possible to admit the relevance of revelation as a source of further guidance for Man. He points out that the Prophet of Islam represents in his person the bridge between the System of Revealed Truth and the gospel of self-realization of that Truth. In his words:

“Looking at the matter from this point of view, then, the Prophet of Islam seems to stand between the ancient and the modern world. In so far as the source of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the ancient world; in so far as the spirit of his revelation is concerned he belongs to the modern world. In him life discovers other sources of knowledge suitable to its new direction. The birth of Islam, as I hope to be able presently to prove to your satisfaction, is the birth of inductive intellect. In Islam prophecy reaches its perfection in discovering the need of its own abolition. This involves the keen perception that life cannot for ever be kept in leading strings; that in order to achieve full self-consciousness man must finally be thrown back on his own resources. The abolition of priesthood and hereditary kingship in Islam, the constant appeal to reason and experience in the Quran, and the emphasis that it lays on Nature and History as sources of human knowledge, are all different aspects of the same idea of finality.”

Not only are the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* the two sources admissible to us for our knowing *what* the Will of God is, but since no

Prophet will come after Mohammed these remain for us the only sources to fall back upon.

(V)

Past and Present

That being the case the question that arises is: How are we to progress and face the challenge of the changing conditions of society if we are not to fall back upon our capacities for forming independent judgment on legal questions?

In the theory of our jurisprudence, it is the office of the *Mujtahid* to apply the principles of private and public conduct discernible by him in the Qur'an and the traditions of the Prophet, and so work out the rules of conduct which may then be enjoined by the State Authority to be obeyed by those who are members of that Society. I have elsewhere commented upon the nature and scope of this duty of the *Mujtahid* and have suggested that the value of the precedents which have come down to us from the practices of the early statesmen of Islam has to be assessed in the light of our knowledge as to the kind of limitations under which they came to evolve and apply them to the task of securing the day-to-day governance of the territory which fell into their prowess to administer.⁴

It would appear that the approach of the early administrators of Islam to the problems of state-craft was conditioned by two main factors:—

(a) All around the community of the believers lay, scattered about, organised religious groups like those of the Jews and the Christians and other 'non-believers' groups who, taken in their totality, were viewed by the early administrators of Islam as constituting a grave source of danger to the continued existence of the infant Muslim community under their care. The Muslim society was in a state of nascent growth, and was surrounded on all sides by religious communities that could not conceivably have contemplated its existence with equanimity. There was a suppressed sense of indignation against the Prophet and his band of believers who had, by their

⁴ See Brohi, A. K., *Fundamental Law of Pakistan*, Karachi, pp. 731-798.

crusade against idolators, questioned the very foundations of a form of society that pre-existed the advent of Islam: there were, on all sides, to be seen forces of hostility, threats of subversion—and all these had to be counteracted. Every precautionary measure had, therefore, to be taken to fortify the frontiers of the territories in which the Muslim Administrators had undertaken to establish the law of God, and steps had to be taken to ensure that the Muslim community was not harassed or destroyed by the scheming villainies and machinations on the part of the non-believers. Seen in this light, many of the provisions of the covenants drawn up by the early statesmen of Islam between themselves and the non-Muslim communities could be appreciated as reflecting this anxiety on their part to secure, by all appropriate means, the stability of the growing community of believers and to safeguard it against all the possible assaults from the non-believers. It was thus, from the point of view of our early statesmen, a state of emergency that they had to deal with, and the code of political behaviour prescribed by them had reference to their understanding of the practical methods whereby that emergency could, under those circumstances, have been faced by them.

(b) That all the early administrators of Islam were profoundly convinced that the religion of Islam was bound, at not a very distant day, to girdle up the whole of the globe, thus encompassing within it at once the whole of humanity: they felt that until such time as the whole world actually came under the banner of Islam they could afford to wait: they therefore proceeded to make *ad hoc* and *interim* political arrangements to continue the administration of the countries that came under their authority—these arrangements were provisional and were to continue till such time as they felt free to devise ways and means of providing a well-considered framework of governance on a world-wide scale.

They had not, in short, the time to sit back and design a form of policy which would be in accord with the spirit of the teaching of Islam. The more so, when such a thing could not have been considered even as important: it has been hinted earlier that basically

the Islamic teaching had much to do with the development of the individual character of the believers and less to do with the establishment of particular forms of government necessary for the administration of secular affairs. In fact, during the time of the first four right-guided Caliphs there was such a rapid expansion of the world of Islam resulting from victories won by our warriors that the problems that their administration was confronted with were too numerous to have left any time with any of these Caliphs to give any thought to the problem of designing the machinery of the State in accordance with the teaching of their religion. After all they could afford to wait for the day when the spirit of Islam would capture and possess the being of all the inhabitants living on the earth, and in the meanwhile, carry on as best as they could the administration of public affairs. This attitude on their part is amply illustrated in the nature of the measures they improvised from time to time to carry on with commendable skill, imagination and courage the historical task that had fallen to their lot to tackle.

It would therefore be a misreading of the whole phase of the early history of Islam, if the forms of governance which were improvised by the Muslims during the thirty years intervening the death of the Prophet and the dastardly assassination of 'Ali, the fourth Caliph of Islam, are uprooted from their historical context and exhibited as though they grew up in a splendid isolation and then held aloft and characterised as models for being adopted in these times when the world has moved away from them in time by 1,300 years and has brought forth within itself an altogether different sort of economico-political cosmos for the modern man to adjust and adapt himself to. Our contemporary situation demands that we should apply our rational faculties for the purpose of designing action—and the improvisation of constitutional arrangements is just one of these actions and by no means any the more important than others—for regulating the life of society. It is only the indolent mind that would like to submit slavishly to the precedents of the past. The history of those first thirty years can be a source of in-

spiration for us and can help us to reconstruct for ourselves the remarkable manner in which the early administration of Islam fulfilled their tasks—but to say that across these 1,300 years, the forms of government the early administrators of Islam improvised continue to be relevant is, in my opinion, an attitude which cannot be defended upon the plain facts of history.

In the light of such rational powers as the Creator has endowed man with, it is his duty each time he comes to deal with it to look upon the world *de novo* and courageously assume the full responsibility for the handling of his own affairs, untrammelled by the consideration that those that had preceded him, by at least a time lag of 1,300 years, had solved their problems of state-craft in a manner radically different from the one which appeals to him as being relevant today.

Thus, upon a careful examination, the relationship of a Muslim to God turns out to be far more complex than Keyserling is wont to have us believe. Though a man is to be likened to a soldier who must unconditionally obey God's Will, there are matters in which a man is a law-giver also, that is, is himself a general—of course, the limit is that in laying down the law he cannot transcend the limits that have been imposed upon him by God's Law. But, then, it is here that the universality of Islam comes in, and may we not remind ourselves, in words quoted by Iqbal himself from that living Orientalist Mr. Horten, 'Professor of Semitic Philosophy, University of Bonn, that "the spirit of Islam is so broad that it is practically boundless. With the exception of atheistic ideas alone, it has assimilated all the attainable ideas of surrounding peoples and given them its peculiar direction of development."

It is in this sense that Islam as a spiritual force is capable of vivifying, fertilising all earthly formations and of raising them, of transforming them into becoming the expression of the Divine. This it achieves because of its universality, because of the catholicity of its outlook, because of its lack of specific content. It is for this reason again that it is Islam that each time has saved the people professing its faith from total decline and degeneration.

(VI)

When voices of scepticism and cynicism are being heard all around, coming from those who are as little qualified to instruct us upon matters that we have been considering as is a pet kitten qualified to talk about tariff reform, it is heartening to know that we are not alone and that Iqbal is still with us—and his example to be conceived in the image of a light-house that shows the way to every weather-beaten, tempest-tossed, ship-wrecked mariner who is engaged in negotiating the boundless world of Muslim Thought and belief; and so long as we continue to take legitimate pride in the fact that we are fellow-workers with Iqbal in the very cause for which he laboured, we will not go under—this is so because, in the wise words of Hafiz:

هرگز نه میرد آنکه دلش زنده شد بعشق ثبت است بر جریده عالم دوام ما

I have often for hours stood silently by the shrine in Lahore where the earthly remains of Iqbal lie buried under the cover of a grave and have mused within myself on the meaning of his Mission—and have invariably chanted those lovely lines of that immortal sonnet of *Blanco White* entitled "Night", as they for me seem to convey the secret of the darkness of earthly life which Iqbal too in his own way all through his life attempted to dispel:

Mysterious Night ! when our first parent knew
Thee from report divine, and heard thy name,
Did he not tremble for this lovely frame,
This glorious canopy of light and blue ?
Yet 'neath a curtain of translucent dew,
Bathed in the rays of the great setting flame,
Hesperus with the host of heaven came,
And lo ! Creation widened in man's view.
Who could have thought such darkness lay concealed
Within thy beams, O Sun ! or who could find,
Whilst flow'r and leaf and insect stood revealed,
That to such countless orbs thou mad'st us blind !
Why do we then shun Death with anxious strife ?
If Light can thus deceive, wherefore not Life ?

IQBAL : A GREAT HUMANIST

LUCE-CLAUDE MAITRE

Muhammad Iqbal (1873-1938) is one of the greatest figures in the literary history of the East. He came at a difficult moment to give courage and hope not only to the Muslims of India (at a time when Pakistan did not yet exist) but to a whole nation sunk into a state of bleak despair.

An original thinker, Iqbal gave his philosophy the garb of poetry and published a number of works amongst which can be quoted: *Asrar-i-Khudi* (*The Secrets of the Self*), *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi* (*The Mysteries of Selflessness*), *Payam-i-Mashriq* (*The Message of the East*) and *Javid Namah* (*The Book of Eternity*, baptised *the Divine Comedy of the Orient*). Knowing Persian as well as Urdu, he expressed himself in both these languages and, sometimes, even in English, as is the case with his doctorate thesis, *The Metaphysics of Persia* (Munich University) and of a collection of lectures he delivered in Madras, entitled "*Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*."

Iqbal had the ambition to bring East and West closer to each other through a synthesis of both cultures. If he criticised Europe which, he thought, was oblivious of spiritual values, he nevertheless set as an example to his country the dynamism of Western thought. He also stressed that material progress can be really fruitful only if it is accompanied by moral progress, and that matter must be conquered in order to free the Mind.

The message of Iqbal, like that of all great poets, has a universal value, and everyone can find in his generous inspiration an answer to his other problems.

Muhammad Iqbal made his appearance at a critical moment in the history of his country. The Muslims of India, forgetful of their past glory, had sunk into a deep slumber, into a bleak despair caused

by lassitude and abdication. Europe, on the contrary, was at the acme of her successes at the end of the 19th century, and all seemed for the best in a world where optimism was the order of the day. Why this contrast? What deep-rooted causes had made of the sub-continent the homeland of a defeated and humiliated people? This is what Iqbal set out to discover. In this universe deserted by happiness and even by the mere joy of living, he was the Awakener, the prophet bearing the message of a new and exhilarating Truth.

Where did the evil come from? According to Iqbal, the importation into Islam of platonician and neo-platonician ideas had sapped the vitality of the Muslims. For Plato, says he:

A wise man looks at death;

Life is like a spark in the darkness of night.

The Greeks of old considered life as an appearance, an illusion of which the famous Myth of the Cavern gives a perfect illustration. They were overwhelmed by the idea of Fatality, and freedom of the will did not exist for them. It is impossible to evade one's destiny: such is the theme of Greek tragedy. The philosophers taught renunciation of the Self and detachment from worldly riches. This movement of thought penetrated into the East and led to an explosion of mysticism whose high priests were the Sufis. A complete divorce was thus affected between Mind and Matter: the soul alone is important and the body must be ignored as a shameful object.

Christianism, according to Iqbal, repeated the same error and was therefore incapable of developing into a perfect *code of life*; it remained an *order* ideally suited to monks whose only interest was the Other World. It arrested the growth of man and condemned him to be torn eternally by an excruciating conflict.

Iqbal raises a protest against this negative and paralysing influence which prevents man from working to improve and change his condition. Action is the fountainhead of life, and, in order to act, the individual must cultivate his Ego, for "in building up one's Ego lies the secret of godhead".

"O Sufi, can your cloistered prayers achieve anything?" asks the poet, and he compares the Sufi and the true Muslim:

One seeks God through mortification of the flesh,
The other sharpens his ego on the divine whetstone;
One kills the ego and reduces it to ashes,
The other lights the ego like a lamp.

For Iqbal, every living organism has a more or less developed individuality which determines its place in the scale of being. In Man alone does this individuality become Personality: "Throughout the entire gamut of being runs the gradually rising note of ego-hood till it reaches its perfection in man."

Every atom of this universe burns to reveal itself;
Every particle yearns to be a god.

However, man is not yet a complete individual and, therefore, he is not yet really free. To conquer his freedom, he must first overcome the resistance of matter: "The greatest obstacle in the way of life is matter, Nature; yet Nature is not evil since it enables the inner powers of life to unfold themselves. The ego attains to freedom by the removal of all obstructions in its way. It is partly free, partly determinate, and reaches full freedom by approaching the individual who is most free—God. In a word, life is an endeavour for freedom."

Freedom is therefore a reward to be won. Iqbal has insisted again and again on the necessity and value of effort:

Take not thy banquet on the shore, for there
Too gently flows the melody of life:
Plunge into the sea, do battle with the waves,
For immortality is won in strife.

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Everything lives by a continual strife,

I am perpetually thirsty as if I had fire under my feet.

Iqbal goes even further than this and does not hesitate to say that the key to the problem of Good and Evil is to be found in the idea of Personality: "The idea of personality gives us a standard

value: it settles the problem of good and evil. That which fortifies personality is good, that which weakens it is bad. Art, religion and ethics must be judged from the standpoint of personality."

And the poet exhorts man to attain his full stature:

Art thou a mere particle of dust?
Tighten the knot of thy ego
And hold fast to thy tiny being!
How glorious to burnish one's ego.
And to test its lustre in the presence of the Sun!
Rechisel thy ancient frame
And build up a new being!
Such being is thy true being
Without which thy ego is but a ring of smoke!
And the miracle takes place:
My being grew and reached the sky,
The Pleiads sank to rest under my skirts.

exclaims the poet in a moment of supreme rupture.

Man must first strive to conquer his environment. This is the initial step he has to take if he wants to discover the inmost secrets of his soul:

The world of the spirit which has no frontiers
Can only be conquered by a persistent crusade.
Strike a dagger in the body of the Universe,
It is full of jewels like the idol of Somnath.
Our mind has failed to realise
That the dust on our path is a dust of diamonds.

Or else:

To become earth is the creed of a moth;
Be a conqueror of earth, that alone is worthy of a man.

And Iqbal defines his position in this way:

"The life of the ideal consists not in a total breach with the real, which would tend to shatter the organic wholeness of life into painful oppositions, but in the endeavour of the ideal to appropriate the real with a view eventually to absorb it and to convert it into itself and to illuminate its whole being."

Iqbal agrees with the German philosopher, Nietzsche, to say that the Will to Power motivates all the actions of men:

Life is power in action;

It derives from the love of domination and conquest.

That Will to Power is the will to enjoy life in all its fullness and exuberance. It maintains the ego in a state of perpetual tension and helps it to attain perfection:

O thou that wouldst deliver thy soul from enemies,

I ask thee: 'Art thou a drop of water or a gem?' . . .

The drop was not solid and gem-like;

The diamond had a being, the drop had none.

Never for an instant neglect self-preservation:

Be a diamond, not a dew-drop!

Iqbal does not hesitate to proclaim that power is synonymous with truth and determines the scale of values:

Good is evil if your power thereby decreases,

Evil is good if it increases your power.

And he adds:

Life is the seed and power the crop;

Power explains the mystery of truth and falsehood.

A claimant, if he be possessed of power,

Needs no argument for his claim.

Falsehood derives from power the authority of truth,

And by falsifying truth deems itself true.

Its creative word transforms poison into nectar,

It says to Good: 'Thou art bad' and Good becomes Evil.

Iqbal thinks nevertheless that the unlimited power which science has given to men must be controlled and directed by a higher ideal; it becomes a tool of destruction when it separates itself from religion:

If it (power) is not subjected to religion, it becomes more dangerous than poison;

If it is subjected to religion, it becomes a panacea for all ills.

But Power alone could not ensure the dazzling metamorphosis of man. The most effective weapon in this fight with Heaven, the weapon which makes all victories possible, is Love. Iqbal does not use this word in the derisively narrow sense to which it has been reduced: when he speaks of Love, he speaks of something infinite—it is for him the projection of man outside himself to embrace the whole Universe:

It is love that imparts colour to the tulip,
It is love that agitates our souls.
If you open up the heart of this earth,
You will see in it the blood-stains of love.

And the poet gives men a solemn warning:

Love is eternal and will end only with eternity.
Many will be those who will seek love;
To-morrow, on Judgment Day,
Those who have not loved will be condemned.

It is love which enables man to explore and develop his inner possibilities:

My being was an unfinished statue. . . .

Love chiselled me: I became a man.

However, Love cannot defeat the forces of Evil and give man his real stature if it is not accompanied by detachment—what the poet calls *faqr*. One should not be misled by the word: it has for Iqbal a significance entirely different from the one it had acquired in mystical literature. It has a positive content, and does not imply a turning away from reality but a detaching of the self from the Un-essential to reach the Essential: The boat of a *faqir*, says Iqbal, is always tossed by the waves.

Iqbal wants to give back to man his lost dignity:

The position of man is higher than that of the sky;

The essence of culture is respect for man.

He wants to transform the ape-man of Darwin into a godhead. In order to achieve his aim, he takes the Qur'an as his guide: "Verily, we have given honour and dignity to man." "We created you, We

gave you shape and then We ordered the angels to prostrate themselves in front of Adam."

Iqbal rejects the traditional idea of the "fall" of man which makes of his earthly life a painful exile. The coming of man is, in his opinion, a glorious event hailed by the whole creation:

Love acclaimed the birth of a being with a yearning heart;
Beauty trembled, for one gifted with vision was born.
Nature quaked, for from the helpless clay was born a self-creating, self-destroying and self-observing being.
Life said: 'I have at last forced an opening into this ancient dome.'

A whisper reverberated around the heavens and reached the abode of the Eternal:

Beware, ye who are veiled, for the one who would rend asunder the veil is born!

It is Satan—Iblis, as Iqbal calls him—who will give man the necessary stimulus. He will show him the way to knowledge and perfection. Man will succumb not to evil but to his curiosity. Satan, by rebuking him for his lack of audacity and adventurous spirit, will lead him on from conquest to conquest.

In Iqbal's great work, *Javid Namah (The Book of Eternity)*, Satan complains to God that man is an unworthy adversary. He, therefore, beseeches Him to send a more defiant enemy, a real opponent:

"O Lord of the Just and of the Unjust, the company of man has made me weary, it has reduced me to nothing! Never did he rebel against my domination; he closed his eyes upon his Ego and never found himself! His dust never tasted of bold refusal; it knows not the spark of Power! The prey says to the hunter: 'Take me!' May God save us from too docile a servant! Free me, O Lord, from this prey; remember that I swore allegiance to thee but yesterday! Man has enfeebled my courage. Alas, Alas! Weak and wavering, he is incapable of resisting the strength of my wrist. I want a servant of thine

endowed with a penetrating gaze, a higher, more mature being! Take back this toy of water and clay, old men do not like children's games! What is the son of man? A handful of dry wood which but one of my sparks could set ablaze. And if there is nothing but dry wood in this world, why didst thou give me so much fire? It is easy to melt a piece of glass, but how hard it is to liquefy a stone! I am saddened by my conquests and I now come for my reward: I want thee to give me a being who can deny me; open for me the path to such a man of God! I want a man who can bend my neck, a man whose gaze sets my whole body a-trembling! A man who will tell me: 'Go away!' A man in front of whom my grain and my wind would be of no value. O Lord! Grant me the joy to subjugate a real man, a worshiper of Truth!"

Once liberated, man will set out on a triumphant march towards the ideal image he has formed of himself:

Rise, O thou who art strange to Life's mystery,

Rise, intoxicated with the wine of an Ideal,

An ideal shining as the dawn,

A blazing fire to all that is other than God,

An ideal higher than Heaven—

Winning, captivating, enchanting men's hearts;

A destroyer of ancient falsehoods,

Fraught with turmoil, an embodiment of the Last Day.

Iqbal has thus placed man at the centre of his philosophy; he makes him the only subject of his preoccupations. He sees in him a creator capable of transfiguring himself, as well as transfiguring the world. Man, therefore, assumes inordinate proportions in his eyes; he becomes a kind of demiurge who speaks to God as an equal:

Thou didst create night and I made the lamp,

Thou didst create clay and I made the cup.

Thou didst create the deserts, mountains and forests,

I produced the orchards, gardens and groves;

It is I who turn stone into a mirror,

And it is I who turn poison into an antidote.

Man must rebuild a world of his own choice:

God decreed: 'It is like this and you have nothing to say';

Man said: 'Verily, it is like this, but it ought to be like that'.

And the poet asks challengingly:

God made the world; man made it more fair.

Is man destined to become the rival of God?

Iqbal incites man to become what he really is:

Create if thou art alive: seize, like me, the sky with your hands!

How long will you beg light like Moses on Mount Sinai?

Let a flame similar to that of the Burning Bush leap out of your
Being!

Break to pieces whatever is not worthy of thee, shape a new
world drawn from the depths of your being!

Man of God, be as dazzling and as sharp as the edge of a sword;
be the architect of the destinies of the world!

The great Persian poet of the 13th century, Jalal-uddin Rumi—who was Iqbal's master—had also dreamt of the advent of the Perfect Man and, equipped with a lantern, like Diogenes, he had set out to find him:

Yesterday, the master with a lantern was roaming about the
city

Saying: 'I am tired of devil and beast. I want a man!

My heart is weary of these weak-spirited companions.

I desire the Lion of God and Rustam, son of Zal'.

They said: 'He is not to be found, we have sought him long'.

He said: 'A thing that is not to be found—that is what I desire'.

It is not by a mere chance that Iqbal placed these verses at the beginning of the combined edition of *Asrar-i-Khudi* and *Rumuz-i-Bekhudi*. All his philosophy is indeed a quest or, to be more exact, a conquest of man. The Perfect Man is the end-result of an impassioned search, the glorious affirmation of the dignity, and even of the divinity, of the creature who contemplates its Creator face to face:

Through his self-realisation he becomes the hand of God;
And as he becomes the hand of God, he rules over the Universe.
Man must be bold enough to take this prodigious leap forward:
Transmute thy handful of earth into gold,
Kiss the threshold of a Perfect Man.

He then becomes the *mahdi*, the guide, the herald of a new era:

"The *na'ib* is the vicegerent of God on earth. He is the completest ego, the goal of humanity, the acme of life both in mind and body; in him the discord of our mental life becomes a harmony. The highest power is united in him with the highest knowledge. In his life, thought and action, instinct and reason, become one. He is the last fruit of the tree of humanity and all the trials of a painful evolution are justified because he is to come at the end. He is the real ruler of mankind; his kingdom is the Kingdom of God on earth."

This is how the poet hails his coming:

Appear, O rider of Destiny!
Appear, O light of the dark realm of Change! . . .
Silence the noise of the nations,
Imparadise our ears with thy music!
Arise and tune the harp of brotherhood,
Give us the cup of the wine of love!
Bring once more days of peace to the world,
Give a message of peace to them that seek battle!
Mankind is the cornfield and thou the harvest,
Thou art the goal of Life's caravan.

However, Iqbal did not want this Perfect Man to be a myth, nor did he want him to be the excessive dream of a poet. He had understood that man can only live in and for society and that he is closely linked to the group to which he belongs:

The individual exists in relation to the community,
Alone, he is nothing.
The wave exists in the river,
Outside the river, it is nothing.

He had meticulously drawn the plan of this society, whose prophet he was, and he set out enthusiastically to build it because it symbolised for him "universal brotherhood and the fullness of love". He suffered to see mankind divided into warring camps, and all his life he worked for the reconciliation of nations:

Greed has split up humanity into warring camps; so speak the language of love and teach the lesson of brotherhood!

The God-intoxicated *Faqir* is neither of the East nor of the West;
I belong neither to Delhi nor to Isphahan; I speak out what
I consider to be the truth.

In Iqbal's eyes, discriminations based on colour and race are a scourge for humanity. He kept repeating that a harmonious life would remain impossible on the earth as long as such distinctions exist:

Not Afghans, Turks or sons of Tartary,
But of one garden, of one trunk are we;
Shun the criterion of scent and hue,
We all the nurslings of one springtime be.

He had dreamt of a society in which true brotherhood would exist and where the social rank of man would not be determined by his caste, his colour, or his fortune, but by the kind of life he leads: a world, says Iqbal, "where the poor tax the rich, where an Untouchable can marry the daughter of a king, and where capital is not allowed to accumulate so as to dominate the real producer of wealth."

Iqbal cherished the vision of a world-state in which all the Muslims would form an indivisible community. He also dreamt of a world in which politics and religion would be associated so closely that they would be indistinguishable.

A few critics have claimed that the message of Iqbal was meant, above all, for the Muslim world and that, therefore, it could not have a universal value. The poet himself has explained very clearly his point of view on this fundamental question:

"The object of my Persian *Masnavi* is not to attempt an advocacy of Islam. My real purpose is to look for a better

social order and to present a universally acceptable ideal (of life and action) before the world, but it is impossible for me, in this effort, to outline this ideal, to ignore the social system and values of Islam whose most important objective is to demolish all the artificial and pernicious distinctions of caste, creed, colour and economic status. Islam has opposed vehemently the idea of racial superiority which is the greatest obstacle in the way of international unity and co-operation; in fact, Islam and racial exclusiveness are utterly antithetical. This racial ideal is the greatest enemy of mankind and it is the duty of all well-wishers of the human race to eradicate it. When I realised that the conception of nationalism based on the differences of race and country, was beginning to overshadow the world of Islam also and that the Muslims were in danger of giving up the universality of their ideal in favour of a narrow patriotism and false nationalism, I felt it my duty, as a Muslim and as a well-wisher of humanity, to recall them back to their true role in the drama of human evolution. No doubt I am intensely devoted to Islam but I have selected the Islamic community as my starting point not because of any national or religious prejudice but because it is the most practicable line of approach to the problem."

Owing to his dynamic and constructive philosophy, to his insatiable curiosity and zest in living, Iqbal succeeded in creating a happy equilibrium between the highest values of the East and of the West. He looked upon the world sympathetically and nothing he saw appeared to him negligible:

For the seeing eye, everything is worth seeing,

Everything is worth being weighed on the scale of vision.

These verses are echoed by those of Jalaluddin Rumi, who said:

Dissolve thy whole body into Vision,

Be seeing, seeing, seeing!

"Everything in the world is strange and wonderful for those who keep their eyes wide open", replies the Spanish philosopher, Jose Ortega y Gasset. And this echo is, in its turn, reverberated by the voice of the great American poet, Walt Whitman:

I believe a leaf of grass is no less than the journey-work of the stars.

This is the way of the poets, this is the way they converse, from one continent to the other, from one century to the other.



IQBAL IN THE WITNESS BOX

MUHAMMAD ABDULLA QURAISHI

In 1931, the Kashmir movement was at its height in Lahore. The Dogra ruler had made life difficult for the Muslims of Kashmir. The Muslim majority was being sacrificed at the altar of Hindu minority. Muslims all over India had raised their voice of protest against this high-handedness. Through public meetings and protest marches, deep sympathy for the persecuted people of Kashmir was being demonstrated.

In the beginning these public meetings were held in the famous Municipal garden outside Mochi Gate. Among those, who actively participated in these meetings, were Mian Nizam-ud-Din, Haji Rahim Bakhsh, Syed Mohsin Shah—all Kashmiri dignitaries—and Professor 'Ilm-ud-Din Salik of Islamia College, Lahore. The latter not only organized the meetings, but also telegraphically communicated to the Secretary of State, the Viceroy, the Political Agent, the Maharaja of Kashmir, the Resident and other officers concerned, the resolutions passed at those meetings.

Moved by this show of sympathy, outstanding Indian Muslim leaders, in the fields of politics, religion and law, assembled in Simla and founded the Kashmir Committee, whose first president was Mirza Bashiruddin Mahmud and the last Sir Muhammad Iqbal. This committee was formed to render legal assistance to the people of Kashmir. It was through its efforts that a large number of persons, who were perishing in the State prisons, were set free. The committee also gave financial assistance to the national workers.¹

After sometime, the Majlis-i-Ahrar took charge of the Kashmir movement and the centre of activities moved to the garden outside

1. See, M. Abdullah Qureshi Article "Iqbal and Kashmir", in the *Iqbal*, Oct: 1956, Vol. No. 2 and *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*.

the Delhi Gate. The Majlis-i-Ahrar was an active organization. Its fire-brand speakers put aflame the whole of India, and the country began to resound with the slogan "*Kashmir Chalo*" (Forward to Kashmir).

This was a time when every problem was viewed from the communal angle. The demand for a democratic system of government in Kashmir was viewed likewise. The Hindus felt that the Muslims were carrying on the campaign against the Maharaja of Kashmir for the simple reason that he was a Hindu. They also felt that if a democratic system of government was established in the State, it would create a Muslim-majority region, which, in turn, will lead to Muslim ascendancy in Kashmir. On that account, the Hindus started opposing it and as a counter-measure started a movement against the state of Hyderabad Deccan, whose ruler was a Muslim. They raised the slogan "*Deccan Chalo*" (Forward to Deccan).

On 20th December, 1931, under the auspices of the Majlis-i-Ahrar, the Muslims of Lahore took out a big procession in connection with the Kashmir movement. The procession was essentially peaceful, but it provoked the Hindus to take out a similar procession. The Hindus took out their procession on 26th December. Beli Ram Telwala of Machhi Hatta (Shah 'Alami Gate) was the organizer and leader of the procession. He was a great fanatic. Raising provocative slogans, the procession, after passing the Circular Road, wended its way to Mochi Gate. With the connivance of the police, the processionists entered the gate and molested a few Muslim shopkeepers, who carried their trade in the shops located on the ground floor of the Unchi Masjid and the mosque of Mulla Muhammad Saleh Kamboh, an eminent historian of Shah Jahan's reign.

This upset the Muslims very much, as the behaviour and conduct of the Hindu crowd was obviously menacing. The Muslims also started collecting but the Deputy Inspector General of Police, Mr. Salettary, dispersed them with a heavy hand. Mr. Salettary was commanding a big force. He was the same Mr. Salettary who afterwards was nominated as a member of the Panjab Public Service

Commission. Professors Sayyid Abdul Qadir and Maulana 'Ilmuddin Salik of Islamia College, strongly protested to Mr. Salettary against this high-handedness. But he did not listen to them and the situation grew worse. Hot words were exchanged and in the meantime the procession moved on. Mr. Salettary was forced to accompany it.

When the procession reached Anarkali Bazar, some irresponsible Hindu youngmen assaulted a Muslim, named Noor Muhammad, and killed him on the spot. Noor Muhammad lived in Kucha Kakkezaian, near Old Kotwali and Masjid Wazir Khan.

The news of Noor Muhammad's cold-blooded murder spread like wild fire in the city and sounded the bugle for a Hindu-Muslim riot. Section 144 was clamped over the city. The procession was dispersed and the body of Noor Muhammad was brought to the Mayo Hospital for a post-mortem examination.

The following day the police handed over the body of Noor Muhammad to his relatives in the burial ground, situated near the tomb of Ghore Shah. Despite the enforcement of Section 144, thousands of Muslims joined the funeral procession. The Deputy Commissioner of Lahore, with a strong police force, was present at the grave-yard. At his request, Mian Abdul Aziz, Bar-at-Law, the first Mayor of the Corporation of the City of Lahore, asked the Muslims to disperse but no one listened to his appeal. The angry crowd returned in the form of a procession and rioting and killing started in the city. The Hindus, if they got a chance, attacked the Muslims and the Muslims too did not spare the Hindus, if they could lay their hands on them.

On December 27, 1931, at about half-past three in the afternoon, near Chowk Rang Mahal, someone stabbed a Hindu shopkeeper, named Lal Chand. The assailant made good his escape. The neighbouring Hindu shopkeepers collected on the spot. The police also reached the place of the occurrence and the wounded Lal Chand was removed immediately to Ganga Ram Hospital in Wacchowali Street (inside Shah 'Alami Gate). In the hospital his declaration was

recorded by a 1st Class Magistrate, named Kehar Singh. In this statement, the deceased declared that he was assaulted by Ghulam Mustafa who once had a shop in Rang Mahal and now lived in Kucha Chabuk Sawaran. After making this statement, Lal Chand succumbed to his injuries and the police took his body for post-mortem examination to the Mayo Hospital.

The name of Ghulam Mustafa was put into the mouth of the deceased by the Hindu leaders, but there was no evidence to the effect that he was the assailant. As a matter of fact, the conspiracy to involve Ghulam Mustafa in a murder case was in keeping with the Hindu-Muslim mentality that was then the order of the day. There were several small shops on the ground floor of the mosque of Maulvi Fazl-i-Ilahi. In one of these shops Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa ran a book-depot ten years back. His shop in those days was the rendezvous of political workers and men of letters.

Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa was himself a poet. He wrote poetry in Punjabi and had taken "Hairat" as his pen name. He published a monthly magazine "FIRDAUS" and a weekly humorous journal "AKA BAKA". "FIRDAUS" was edited for some time by Badruddin Badr, Sirajuddin Nizami and the writer of this article. Among those who used to come to Ghulam Mustafa's book shop were (Dr.) Muhammad Din Taseer, Master Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim, Malik Lal Din Qaisar, Dr. Nazir Ahmad (present Principal of Government College, Lahore), (Col.) Majid Malik, Abul Asar Hafeez Jullundri, Ghulam 'Abbas (the well-known short-story writer), Prof. M. 'Ilmuddin Salik, Ustad Hamdam and Ustad Ishq Lehr (both well-known Punjabi poets), Professor Muhammad Jamil Wasti and Feroz-ud-Din Nizami. Another gentleman by the name of 'Ilmuddin of Chauhatta Mufti Baqir also used to visit this place. He was quite an active worker of the Majlis-i-Ahrar until 1940. When the Majlis-i-Ahrar organized its national guard, he also helped in its organization.²

2. Abdullah Malik, article "Yadon ke Mazar" in the *Weekly Lail-o-Nahar*, Lahore, January 10, 1960.

These were the days when Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat and Malik Lal Din Qaisar had actively participated in the different movements, namely the Fifty-six Percent Rights Movement, Nizam Committee, Warzish (Exercise) Committee, restoration of the body of 'Ilmuddin Shahid, Sarda Act, prohibition of Azan in Zafarwal. The Hindus hated them very much and wanted to involve them in some trouble. This was their opportunity and they made full use of it.

The deceased Lal Chand had named Ghulam Mustafa and the prosecution witnesses accused Lal Din and 'Ilmuddin also. But there was no way for the police to know that by Lal Din was meant Lal Din Qaisar. They arrested Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat, as he lived nearby. He was well known in the area. He once owned a shop there, and was currently employed in the Municipal Committee. But in place of Lal Din Qaisar, the police arrested another Lal Din who was a mason by profession. Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa was challaned under Section 302 IPC and Lal Din under Section 323 and 504 IPC.

After preliminary trial, the case was committed to the Sessions. In order to prove the innocence of Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa, many prominent Muslims offered to give evidence before the court. In all 46 witnesses were summoned. The names of some of them are given below:

1. Haji Mir Shamsuddin, who was not only a Life Secretary of the Anjuman-i-Himayat-i-Islam but also was one of its founders.
2. Nawab Sir Zulfiqar 'Ali Khan, Member, Central Assembly.
3. Sir Muhammad Iqbal.
4. Maulana Shaukat 'Ali.
5. Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan, Owner and Editor of the Daily *Zamindar*, Lahore.
6. Mian 'Abdul 'Aziz, Bar-at-Law, Chairman, Municipal Committee, Lahore.

7. Sheikh Sadiq Hasan (of Amritsar), Member, Legislative Assembly.
8. (Col.) Majid Malik, Editor, *Muslim Outlook* and *Sunrise*, Lahore.
9. Maulana Ghulam Rasul Mihr, Editor, the *Inqilab*, Lahore.
10. Maulana 'Abdul Majid Salik, Editor, the *Inqilab*, Lahore.
11. Sayyid Habib, Editor, the *Siyasat*, Lahore.
12. Maulana Muhammad Ya'qub Khan, Editor, the *Light*, Lahore.
13. Maulana Dost Muhammad, Editor, the *Paigham-i-Sulh*, Lahore.
14. Shamsuddin Hasan, Editor, the *Khawar*, Lahore.
15. Hakim Muhammad Yusuf Hasan, Editor, the *Nairang-i-Khayal* and *Taziana*, Lahore.
16. Qazi 'Abdul Majid Qarshi, Editor, the *Iman*, Patti (District Lahore).
17. Chaudhri 'Abdul Karim, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
18. Chaudhri Sardar 'Ali, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
19. Khan Sahib Ch. Fath Sher, Municipal Commissioner and Hony. Magistrate, Lahore.
20. Sheikh Hasan Din, Pleader and Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
21. Chaudhri Din Muhammad, Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
22. Sheikh 'Azim Ullah, Pleader and Municipal Commissioner, Lahore.
23. Khawaja Dil Muhammad, Professor, Islamia College and Municipal Commissioner.
24. Sayyid 'Abdul Qadir, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.
25. Maulana 'Ilm-ud-Din Salik, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.

26. (Dr.) Muhammad Din Taseer, Professor, Islamia College, Lahore.
27. Master Muhammad Bakhsh Muslim, Editor, *Cooperation*, Lahore.
28. Khalifa Shahab-ud-Din, Secretary, Anjuman Khuddam-uddin, Lahore.
29. Hakim Muhammad Sharif, Secretary, Anjuman Mu'in-ul-Islam, Lahore.

During the hearing of the case, an interesting incident took place. One of the defence witnesses was an old man, named Malik Nabi Bakhsh, who was present nearly at the time of the occurrence. After receiving injuries, Lal Chand had gone to him to seek refuge. There was a great difference between his statement and the statements of the prosecution witnesses regarding the time of the occurrence. The prosecution with a view to proving that Malik Nabi Bukhsh was old and senile, put all sorts of questions to him. He, however, answered every question correctly and did not waver for a minute. Thereupon the court asked him if he had a watch at the time of the occurrence. The witness said he did not know how to tell the time as he never kept a watch all his life. The court then asked how he had calculated the time. The witness said that he found out the time by observing the sun, the moon and the stars. In order to test the veracity of his statement, the Sessions Judge asked him what time it was then. And the witness at once gave the correct time. The clock was at the back of the witness and it showed exactly the time mentioned by the witness. This incident impressed the court immensely and it was convinced that the witness was telling the truth.

The hearing of the case lasted several days. Khawaja Feroz-ud-Din, Bar-at-Law, appeared for Shaikh Ghulam Mustafa and drew much attention. The Sessions Judge, who heard the case, was Mr. J.K.M. Tapp, the same Mr. Tapp who was for some time the Secretary of the Lahore Municipal Committee and after whom the road in front of the Punjab Veterinary College was named Tapp Road. He lived there. The Session Judge held his

court in the Shah Chiragh Mosque, which had not yet been restored to the Muslims. Later on, Mr. Tapp became an Acting Judge of the Lahore High Court.

Sir Muhammad Iqbal took personal interest in the case. He wrote comforting letters to Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa while he was in jail and assured him of his assistance. In one of his letters he asked Shaikh Ghulam Mustafa to repeat the names of God *يا حي يا قيوم* which described him as the Ever-Living and Ever-Existing. It is a great pity that the collection of these letters was destroyed in a fire which burned down the house of Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa.

'Allama Sir Muhammad Iqbal went to the court for three consecutive days and gave his advice to Khawaja Ferozuddin, Bar-at-Law. On August 2, 1932, he gave the following statement before the Sessions Judge:

"I have known the accused Ghulam Mustafa for some years. I came to know him in connection with his editorship of a literary Magazine called *Firdaus*. Later he became the editor of a weekly paper. I have also come to know him in connection with general Muslim public movements. Ghulam Mustafa has made speeches on political and social matters at meetings in my presence. I knew him in connection with the 56 Per Cent Rights Movement. This movement was started by the Muslims of Lahore and Ghulam Mustafa also took part in the meetings relating to the MacLagan Engineering College. Ghulam Mustafa helped me and the late Sir Muhammad Shafi very largely in connection with the burial of 'Ilmuddin. Ghulam Mustafa may be regarded as a prominent Muslim worker.

When cross-examined, Dr. Iqbal said:

"Ghulam Mustafa does not help me personally in political matters. Ghulam Mustafa accompanied me along with others to the meeting of the All-India Muslim League at Allahabad. I presided over that meeting."³

3. Sessions Case No. 37 of 1932.

No more defence witness were examined after the court had recorded the statement of Sir Muhammad Iqbal.

On the advice of Sir Muhammad Iqbal, Khawaja Ferozuddin, in his arguments, laid stress on the fact that none of the witnesses had corroborated the statement of the deceased that Ghulam Mustafa kept a shop in Rang Mahal.

At long last the case was dismissed. The accused were found not guilty, and after undergoing tortures for about eight months, they were set free on August 6, 1932.

The Muslims of Lahore went wild with joy over their release. Maulana Zafar 'Ali Khan came out with a strong editorial and also published on the front page of the Zamindar the following poem which he wrote to commemorate this great event:

فیصلہٴ تقدیر

ٹل گیا انگریز کے دارالقضا کا فیصلہ
کیونکہ تھا کچھ اور ہی رب العلا کا فیصلہ
جو فنا کے گھاٹ اترنے کے لئے تیار تھے
عرش اعظم پر ہوا ان کے بقا کا فیصلہ
بے گناہوں کو کیا جائے گا عزت سے بری
پہلے ہی دن ہو چکا تھا یہ خدا کا فیصلہ
مصطفیٰ کی عمر کی قرآن میں کھا کر قسم
خود کیا اس نے غلام مصطفیٰ کا فیصلہ
سال بھر تک جس نے کاٹی قید جرم عشق میں
ہو گیا آج اس گرفتار بلا کا فیصلہ
آ پڑی ہے اکثریت اور اقلیت کی بحث
ہونے والا ہے بہتیجے اور چچا کا فیصلہ
ہم دکھا دیں گے کہ کرتا ہے مسلمان کس طرح
اپنی امیدوں کے خون ناروا کا فیصلہ

(فردوس - نومبر ۱۹۳۲ء)

The expected judgment of the British Court has been averted because God Almighty has decided otherwise.

He was willing to kiss the gallows but God wished him to continue to live.

God had decided on the day of creation that the innocent would be set free with honour.

Swearing by the life of Mustafa in the Qur'ran, God Himself decided the case of Ghulam Mustafa.

He spent a year of distress in the prison for the love of God, but he is free today.

The struggle is between the majority and the minority and the issue between the uncle and the nephew is shortly to be decided.

He will show you how a Muslim settles account with one who slaughters his hopes.

*

*

*

Sheikh Ghulam Mustafa Hairat is still alive and as long as the statement of Iqbal is in existence, he will continue to live.

PHYSICAL WORLD AND THE PRINCIPLE OF COSMIC DYNAMICS

QAZI A. QADIR

We very well know that the most striking feature of Iqbal's philosophy is its emphasis on the dynamic character of everything around us. The principle of this change and dynamism is '*Ishq*'. For Iqbal, '*Ishq*' is the very soul of existence. It can be safely gathered from Iqbal's verses that '*Ishq*' is the principle of Cosmic Dynamics. Iqbal is quite emphatic on this point. For him every movement, constructive change, and all cases of development are manifestations of '*Ishq*'. Instances of this can be found in the spiritual as well as in the natural world.

Ishq demands breaking through every barrier that comes in one's way and in eternally striving after the Ideal. '*Ishq*' is opposed to the categories of reason and discursive thought. Reason and discursive thought aim at clarity and fixity at the expense of totality, unity and activity. Discursive thought never goes beyond analytic understanding. It is finite and its categories are fixed. When these categories are applied to objects and things, they also become fixed and lifeless. The principle of Cosmic Dynamics is opposed to it and tries to break asunder the rigidity to which the discursive thought has reduced everything. Thus '*Ishq*' is the indwelling tendency for outward action by which the rigidity, fixity and lifelessness of rational categories are broken and reason is set to move along the road to continuous development. Because of this vital force reason moves, evolves, and develops. This movement is not found in thought alone, it is inherent also in its objective counterpart: *nature*.

Whatever is there in the world is finite. It is not stable and permanent but changeable and transient. Whatever appears as stable and 'fixed' is in the process of change and development. The whole world we live in is, thus, dynamic.

Now the question is 'What does it mean to say that the world is in a state of Change'?

We can interpret this assertion in two ways. Either at every moment of history, a new thing is coming into being and going away. Once it has come into being it will or it will not, it may or may not, live another moment. Say, a thing 'X' came into being at time T₁ then it is possible that it may live till time T₂ or till time T_n remaining the same all the time. Or X which came into being at time T₁ 'remained' X till time T_n but at every phase of the movement from T₁ to T_n it underwent a series of changes.

Thus :.....at time T₁.....X.
 " " T₂.....X₁.
 " " T₃.....X₂.
 " " T_n.....X_n.

Now, I think, it is precisely this second alternative which is acceptable to Iqbal. He regards the Cosmic Dynamics as involving each and every thing, and taking it to the higher planes of existence. It is besides the point to ask whether this whole process is teleological or mechanistic. This is also pretty irrelevant to talk about the nature of these higher planes of existence. Whether there are such realms of higher existence is a question I am not competent to answer. Possibly there are. But if there are and to which every thing is striving for, what do they imply? What does the whole talk amount to?

In the first place, it suggests us to view every existent as something in a process of change, as something moving and evolving, as something bursting out of itself with all its fury and energy—but not undirected—, as something not at rest any way. This simply means that the world of chairs and tables, of trees and rivers, of beasts and birds, of men and women, is not a dead slice of history. Every bit and chip of this dear old world is to be regarded as a moving lava, as energy manifesting itself in new forms. Thus to talk about chairs and tables is in fact to talk about 'events' or about 'processes' or about 'energies'. These, so to say, are not things but *energies* or *events*.

But, I think, Iqbal would not have liked to use the word 'event' in this context. As we understand, things are 'energies' pure and simple. Words cannot do justice to their dynamic character. Not even the word 'event'. For, what is an event but an arrested movement? But can movement be thus arrested? Certainly not. To do this is to apply the categories of reason and consequently falsify the real nature of things. The nature of things, we are told, is perpetual change and movement. The world of physical and material objects is, consequently, not a world of objects and things but of 'energies' or 'processes'.

Now the question is, Did Iqbal want to deny that there are things in the world? By "things" we mean all these colourful objects which populate our world. All these tables and chairs, and flowers and buds, and many more things which inhabit the world. Did Iqbal deny all these beautiful things? Did he want to say that chairs and tables do not exist? If Iqbal denied the existence of these things, then our propositions about them would be false like our proposition about non-existent things, asserting their existence. Thus the proposition: 'The cat is sitting on the mat' will be as false (even though the cat *is* sitting on the mat) as the proposition 'Gandhi is the King of Russia' or 'I have a dinner date with an Unicorn in the Taj to-day.'

But then, did Iqbal deny the reality of the physical object? Does it mean to say that Iqbal wanted to follow in the footsteps of the Irish Bishop who wanted to clear the world of material objects? Of course not! Iqbal did not belong to those tender-hearted philosophers who could not leave the fire burning 'alone' in the other room lest it may vanish. Not only that Iqbal believed in the existence of material objects but he criticised the attempts at depopulating the world of physical and material objects. He criticised Socrates and his able pupil Plato for taking refuge in the world of Ideas. Iqbal was quite confident that there is a lot to be learnt from the Sun and the Stars, from Rocks and Rivers. Nay, even the least important of things has a message for those who care to look and see. The world which we see, smell and touch does exist. It is not an illusion. The

mistake we commit is while we believe that 'things' exist what really exist are not things but 'energies' or 'processes'. The illusion is that we regard these 'processes' as inert things.

Now let us see what all this amounts to: firstly, it tells us that the propositions, "The cat is sitting on the mat", and, "The Taj is white" should not be accepted at their face value. Either (i) they are false or (ii) they assert partially and not completely what they are supposed to assert—only that they are not suited to describe what they are describing and should now be replaced by some other mode of description.

Secondly, it suggests that people wrongly 'believe' that physical things are dead and inert but, if they 'knew' they would have found that they were living—they were processes.

Now we have seen that the propositions about physical objects are not false in the sense that they do not assert the existence of nonexistent things. 'Things' do exist. What we have now to discuss is (i) whether natural language is inadequate to describe the physical world—and, whether we should coin a new language, and (ii) do people '*believe*' that things exist and do not '*know*' that they (things) exist?

I will take up the second point first. Let us look at these two statements:

1. 'Common-sense *believes* that the earth is flat' and 'common-sense does not *know* that the earth is round';
'The common-sense *believes* that the earth is flat but the geographer very well *knows* that it is round'.
2. 'People *believe* that Comet III is a jet aircraft but the physicist *knows* that it is a bundle of electrical energy.

In the first statement what the common-sense believes is not something false which ought to be corrected or contradicted by the geographer. In fact when a farmer goes out in the field and throwing his hands out he exclaims, "There, that flat stretch of land, that is mine" he is not saying something completely non-sense or something which ought to be corrected by a scientist.

The farmer very well *knows* what he is saying and the listener correctly understands what he is being told. The earth is flat as far as it goes. What is incorrect is the deductions which the farmer draws from his observation. But as far as the second statement is concerned it does not involve any deduction. The man who believes that Comet III is a jet aircraft does not *merely* believe what is the case but knows that such is the case. He *knows* that Comet III is a jet aircraft the way he knows: 'this is my right hand and this is my left hand', when he uses his hands at the supper table. It would be perfectly ridiculous if somebody came up and told the poor man that he had a pair of 'energies' hanging along his right and left shoulders. And certainly Iqbal never thought of anything so simple.

What Iqbal believed and what the commonsense believes is this: when anybody says, "This is a book", or "This is a locomotive," or "This is Comet III", he is using these words correctly and not ambiguously or incorrectly. He knows and does not merely believe that when he pointed to his right hand and said, "This is my right hand", he was using these words very correctly. He also knows that it would have been silly to say, "This is a store of atomic particles" or "This is a bundle of energy". The man also knows that it is incorrect to use words like 'processes' or 'energies' for human hands, or for locomotives, or for books. And isn't it just that to know at all, *i.e.*, being disposed to use certain words correctly?

This brings us to our second point, *viz.*, do we have to coin a new language? We have seen that the commonsense *knows* that things exist and when he says "Things exist" (This is my right hand and pointing towards it) he knows perfectly well that he is using these words correctly. Common-sense does not need a new language.

If we did coin a new language, it would be an entirely unilluminating re-wording or re-writing of names and definitions. But we know that these new linguistic conventions will not give any new information about the physical world. It would be just a new language

like my writing this article in Banto Language rather than in English.

Now finally if we do not need a new language to understand Iqbal and if all that Iqbal has said could be understood in a natural language, why is Iqbal said to be saying something paradoxical?

On my part Iqbal did not say anything paradoxical. The difficulty arises when the simple sentence "Everything is involved in the Cosmic Dynamics" is taken as a factual, empirical statement. It is not a factual statement which can be verified or falsified by empirical experience. In fact, Iqbal wanted to give a philosophy and a 'methodology of Science'. The corner-stone of his scientific philosophy is 'Cosmic Dynamics' or '*Ishq*'. This principle is a prescription which can guide a scientist or a social philosopher in his search for truth and at possible explanation of facts of experience. But in itself it is not an empirical statement.

IQBAL AND NATIONALISM

ZAFAR ISHAQ ANSARI

“It seems to me that God is slowly bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facility of reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.”¹

The fundamental problem confronting Islam today is to determine its attitude *vis-a-vis* the ideas and institutions associated with the modern, non-Islamic civilization. In a sense the problem is not a novel one. Islam has been confronted with the same problem in one form or the other from the very beginning. In the early period of its history the primitive Arab Muslims, who were the standard-bearers of Islam, came into contact with the Greek and Persian civilizations. But if the problems faced by Islam then and now are similar in essence, they are enormously different in magnitude. For then Islam had the vigour of a nascent civilization, and all the prestige of a triumphant power which had overpowered both the great empires of the times. Hence Islam faced the challenge without losing its poise, its self-confidence, even its sense of superiority. But today the situation is altogether different. Since the sixteenth century Muslim society has remained steeped in stagnation and degeneracy and has drifted downward. On the other hand Christendom (the historical rival of Islam) has passed through a process of re-birth and regeneration. It shook itself out of its stupor and made tremendous achievements in all fields of life. In the nineteenth century the superiority of Christian Europe over the Muslim world was no longer a subject of debate. It had already become a solid fact. Consequently Muslim countries lost their independence one after the other, and along with that they

1. Mohammad Iqbal, *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, Lahore, 1954, p. 159.

began to lose their cultural pride and self-confidence. Christendom, towards which the Muslims had looked down in the past with disdain—as religiously misguided and culturally backward—began to win their admiration. With this change in outlook the ideas and institutions of the European society began to penetrate into the Muslim world and to enjoy tremendous prestige as a result of their association with the culture of the dominant nations of the world.

One of the ideas of European origin which has had a serious impact upon the Muslim world (in fact, upon the whole of the East) is that of nationalism. One of the most serious challenges to the traditional values of Islamic society has been posed by this idea.

The questions posed by nationalism have serious theoretical as well as practical implications. In countries where Muslims are in majority, some of the problems with which Muslims are faced are: What place should be assigned to “love of the fatherland” in the hierarchy of values by the Muslim inhabitants of various countries? Will it be proper for them to give the same degree of importance to their particular fatherlands and nationalities as assigned by the present-day nationalists? If the answer to this question is in the affirmative, will this not strike at the roots of the Islamic ideal that Islam should be the pivotal point in their private as well as public life? Will the nationalist ideal not require the development of a nationality and culture which is common to both Muslim and non-Muslim inhabitants of the fatherland? Will this ideal not require that those elements which are common in the life of Muslims as well as non-Muslims are stressed, and Islam—which is not the common denominator between all the various religious groups which compose the nation—be relegated to a secondary position? Will this ideal not reduce Islam to the position of a private affair as has happened in the West? Moreover, if the Muslims accept the modern concept of nationalism, in what way will they be able to meet the claims of Islamic brotherhood, for the Islamic *ummah* has always been considered by them a universal *ummah* indivisible on racial, linguistic, territorial or such other considerations?

And if Muslims were to reject the nationalist idea that the only sound principle of political life is loyalty to the fatherland, then in what way will it be ensured that both the Muslim and non-Muslim members of the nation are welded into a common nationality? What is it that will ensure the participation of all, Muslims as well as non-Muslims, in national life?

The problems facing Muslims in countries where they are in minority are no less difficult. They are faced with the problem as to how they can maintain their distinct identity as members of an ideological community without adopting a negative attitude towards the nation and the state?

Of modern Islamic thinkers, Iqbal was perhaps the first to realize the magnitude of this challenge. No other Muslim thinker has shown as profound an awareness of the implications of the nationalist idea to the Islamic society. In his poems, as well as in his prose writings, he turns again and again to this question and seeks to give the Muslims a definite lead.

In the following pages we shall make an attempt to grasp the standpoint of Iqbal on the problems raised by nationalism and assess its significance. In order to appreciate that, our discussion will be preceded by an attempt to explain the concept of nationalism and its implications, and the classical Islamic attitude on the point.

(I)

Nationalism is a relatively recent phenomenon in human history. In the past man's loyalty, has not been due to the nation—state or nationality, but to differing forms of social authority, political organization and ideological cohesion such as tribe or clan, the city-state or the feudal lord, the dynastic state, the church or the religious group.¹ During the Middle Ages there were hardly any traces of nationalism, either in the Islamic world or in Christendom. In those times the object of popular loyalty was not primarily

1. See Kohn, Hans, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History*, Anvil Books No. 8 (Princeton: 1955), p. 9.

nationality, but religion. In Europe "the object of popular loyalty which, was superior to all others" was Christendom.¹ In the Muslim world a Muslim considered his first loyalty to be due to his faith and to the community of believers and only then to the family or the local group.²

This, however, does not mean that *nationalities* were non-existent in pre-modern times. Nationalities, in the sense of cultural societies conscious of their distinctness, internally homogeneous and alien from other groups, had existed in the Middle Ages and even before. Similarly, patriotism—the attachment to one's native soil and to local traditions—had also existed long. What, however, did not exist in the Middle Ages is the "fusion of patriotism and nationality and the predominance of national patriotism over all other human loyalties. . . . which is nationalism."³

This is indeed modern, very modern. In fact it is not until the seventeenth century that we find the first full manifestation of nationalism in England and it is only towards the end of the eighteenth century that nationalism in the modern sense of the term became a generally recognised sentiment in Europe, increasingly moulding all public and private life.⁴

The rise of nationalism in Europe synchronizes with the disintegration of the mediaeval, and the gradual emergence of the modern civilization. The powerful forces, material as well as ideological, which had been released by Renaissance and Reformation had been in operation for many centuries and had enormously affected the structure of European society and culture and had prepared the ground for the acceptance of the nationalist idea. For instance, there had grown up several regional languages in Europe and each one of them had come to possess fairly rich literature. The Christian Church

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1. Hayes, Carlton J.H., *Essays on Nationalism*, (New York: 1933) p. 28.
 2. Von Grunebaum, G.E., "Problems of Muslim Nationalism", *Islam and the West*, R.N. Frye (ed.), (The Hague: 1957) p. 14.
 3. Hayes, *op. cit.*, p. 29.
 4. Kohn, *op. cit.*, p. 9.

had lost most of its former power and authority. It had split up into several mutually antagonistic churches, and had thus rent asunder the spiritual unity of Christendom. The weakening of feudalism, and later on of monarchy, had increased the active participation of the people in public affairs. Alongwith these changes, new trends of thought like the sovereignty of the people and the doctrine of natural rights were also emerging. Moreover, the economic transformations which were taking place in the pre-modern times had brought into prominence a new economic class, the middle class. Furthermore, there had also occurred a tremendous change in the mentality of the people due to the impact of scientific progress and the emergence of a changing social order under its pressure. The change in the mentality of the people mainly consisted in the refusal of the enlightened sections of the European people to conform blindly to tradition. A number of factors had even weakened the faith of Europeans in Christianity. People had particularly become increasingly weary of the idea that religion should remain the pivotal point in public life. For the memories of religious civil wars, which had ravaged Europe and had led to wholesale massacres, were still fresh in their minds. It is in this milieu that nationality began to acquire an increasing importance in Europe and gradually became the focus of loyalty in the body-politic, and thereby replaced religion as a cohesive force.

Nationalism has naturally passed through various courses of development in various European countries. Hence in certain respects each nationalism is different from all others. There have, however, also grown up certain characteristics which are common to every nationalism. To borrow the words of Carlton Hayes, nationalism is:

“....a condition of mind among members of a nationality, perhaps already possessed of national state, a condition of mind in which loyalty to the ideal or to the fact of one's national state is superior to all other loyalties and of which pride in one's nationality and belief in its intrinsic excellence and in its

“mission” are integral parts.”¹

Nationalist ideology has two basic tenets. In the first place, nationalism believes that each nationality should constitute a united, independent and sovereign state. Hence, if a nationality is subjected to the domination of any other nationality, it should become free and independent; and if the nationality is divided into numerous states, these states should merge in a single national state. Thus, the nationalist view has been that nationality should be the basis of statehood. In the second place, nationalism places national loyalty above all other loyalties.² It is this feature of nationalism which distinguishes it from mere patriotism, which had existed even in pre-modern times.

Nineteenth century was the century of the triumph of nationalism. Nationalism remained a very potent force throughout this century and led to tremendous changes in the political map of Europe. Nation-states had come into existence and had caused numerous important changes in the character of political life. Formerly religion had been the most important cohesive force in the life of the community. Nationalism now led to the replacement of the religious by the national tie. Thus, religion receded into a position of secondary importance in public life. For, nationalism had taught the people to participate in the political life of their nation-states as its citizens, as the members of the English or the French or the Italian nation, and not as Jews and Christians or as Catholics and Protestants. The natural corollary of all this was that state ceased to be an institution which could be expected to devote itself primarily to the promotion of the cause of faith, although this was expected of it during the Middle Ages. State came to be concerned exclusively with the achievement of common national interests and with the nation's material well-being.

1. *Hayes, op. cit.*, p. 6. This is the standard definition of nationalism. Cf. *Kohn, op. cit.*, p. 9.

2. Cf. *Hayes, op. cit.*, pp. 26-29 and *Kohn, op. cit.*, pp. 9-12.

Along with nationalism there developed in Europe the trend of thought which is known as 'secularism'. The impact of this development was that this-worldly matters were separated from other-worldly matters; the concern for well-being here was separated from the concern for the well-being in the hereafter. The rise of nationalism and secularism have coincided in the history of modern Europe and since then have remained inseparable.

(II)

If we turn to the early history of Islam, even to the period of the Holy Prophet, (peace be upon Him) we find Islam facing a problem similar to the problem of nationalism confronting the Muslim society today and the developments which took place during the Prophet's life-time, as well as his teachings, gave Muslim society a definite orientation which has to be borne in mind in trying to appreciate the nature of the challenge posed by nationalism to the contemporary Muslim society.

The society in which the Prophet was born was one organized on the principle of blood-kinship. The need of mutual defence had led to the rise of clans (*qawm*) and tribes (*qabilah*) whose members were tied together by the idea of descent from a common ancestor—whether real or fictitious. Even the religion of the Arabs of those days was a "reflex of the social organisation. Each clan had a clan diety, a counter-part of its clan chieftans in the belief world."¹ The tribe (or its sub-division, the clan) was also the only basis of social security. The tribe alone could ensure the protection of a person's life and property against aggression by other tribes which could be held in check only by the threat of effective retaliation. Moreover, nomadic desert pastoralism could not be carried on by individuals or small family groups, which also gave pre-eminence to the tribe as an economic unit. Accordingly none could afford to live without association with a tribe or clan. If ever a person or a family broke off its ties with the tribe or clan of its birth, it had had to secure the

1. S.A.Q. Husaini, *Arab Administration*, Madras, 1949, p. 9.

protection of some other tribe by seeking to become its client (*mawla*) or protected neighbour (*jar*) or confederate (*halif*).

These tribes regarded themselves as self-sufficient; and thanks to the rigorous conditions of life which frequently led to inter-clan or inter-tribal feuding over water and pasturage, there developed in them a strong tribal particularism. Though sometimes several tribes used to join into a confederation, yet this was only for a limited purpose, such as fighting against a similar confederation of tribes. The main tribes were, therefore, to borrow the words of Montgomery Watt, "sovereign and independent political entities."¹ The attitude of each tribe towards other tribes was based on a deep sense of inherent superiority over others on the ground of ancestral nobility. Each of these tribes competed with others in trying to appropriate the extremely meagre resources of the desert land. The relationship between them was, therefore, generally that of hostility.²

The driving force of this social system was '*asabiyah*, the spirit of clan. It implied, according to Hitti, "boundless and unconditional loyalty of fellow-clansmen" and corresponded in general "to the patriotism of the passionate, chauvinistic type."³ The '*asabiyah* consisted in one's remaining faithful to one's fellow clansman and helping one's brother-in-clan or tribe, be he the wrong-doer or the wronged."⁴ The principle was: "My tribe: right or wrong." A man was required to be always prepared to sink or swim with his clansmen.⁵ Even if that clan asked a person to give up his wife, there was no choice for him but to do so. Thus we find that in the pre-Islamic

1. *Muhammad at Medina*, Oxford, 1956, p. 239.
2. See Taha Husayn and others (ed.), *Al-Mujmal fi Tarikh al-Adab al-'Arabi*, Cairo, 1928, p. 7.
3. Phillip Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, 1956, p. 27.
4. See Ali Jawwad, *Tarikh al-Arab qabl al-Islam*, Vol. I, Cairo, 1950, p. 365.
5. *Al-Mubarrad al Kamil*, ed. W. Wright (Leipzig, 1864), p. 229, L. 3, cited in Hitti, p. 27. According to another poet: "There is nothing for me but that I fail if the expedition (of the tribe) fails, and succeed, if it succeeds." Vide. *Al-Mujmal fi Tarikh al-Adab al-Arabi*, cited by Hitti, *op. cit.*, p. 77.

times the loyalty to the tribe stood above all other loyalties. There do not appear to have existed any moral values to which this unqualified and unlimited loyalty to the tribe could be subordinated. According to *jahili* ethics, the tribal '*asabiyah*' was uppermost in the hierarchy of social values.

The message that the Prophet conveyed to his people was to submit to Allah, the One God; to worship none but Him; to accept him (*i.e.* Muhammad) as the last messenger of Allah; to recognize the guidance that he had brought as the Divine Guidance, and to live a righteous life in accordance with this guidance. He insisted that the duty to God be regarded as above all other duties. Even the duty of obeying parents, which has been frequently emphasised by the Prophet in his own preachings and has also been quite often stressed in the Quran, was not permitted to stand in the way of fulfilling man's duty to God, *viz.*, worshipping none but Him.¹

These ideas created a new focus of loyalty, a loyalty to which all other loyalties had to be subordinated—man's loyalty to his Creator. Later on this resulted in the destruction of the entire *jahili* social order, including the whole value-system on which the social life of those days had rested.

The Prophet's teachings in general and his opposition to idolatry and his appeal to the Quraysh to submit to the discipline of a divinely-ordained moral code in particular, were at first received by them with ridicule and slander, and later on, with persecution of the Prophet and his followers. To the Quraysh these few followers of Muhammad were heretics and apostates, the black sheep who had forsaken the faith of their *qawm* and their forefathers.² To the Holy Prophet and to his followers, their small group constituted the elect; the chosen group which had discovered the Will of God and was

1. *Al-Qur'an*, XXIX:8.

2. That the early Muslims had forsaken the faith of their *qawm*, was an accusation levelled before the Abyssinian King by the emissaries of the Quraysh who went to Abyssinia to persuade Negus to surrender the Muslim emigrants.

trying to carry it out; the *elite* which had been pulled out from darkness into light. Although most of these believers at Mecca belonged to the Quraysh, yet there were also people like Bilal and Zayad ibn Haritha, who were of foreign origin—the ‘*Ajamis*. The result was that the faith preached by the Prophet began to disrupt the contemporary social order by uniting the Abyssinian Bilal with the Qurayshite Abu Bakr in one camp, as co-workers in the cause of faith, as against some of their kith and kin of the Quraysh who were opposed to the new faith.

The continued persecution of the companions of the Holy Prophet at the hands of their kith and kin, the emigration of a considerable number of believers to Abyssinia, the mutual sharing of afflictions by believers of various tribal affiliations in promoting the cause of the faith, the cruelties that were perpetrated upon many of the believers by their own blood-kin—all these factors, besides the teaching of the Quran and the preachings of the Prophet, played a great part in moulding the mental attitude of the *ummah* of the Prophet and in eradicating tribal ‘*asabiyah* and replacing it with an ‘*asabiyah* for the faith of Islam and Muslim community.

The ten years of the Prophet’s Meccan life were decisive in so far as event after event hammered into the minds of the believers that they were a group of people altogether separate and distinct from all other groups, even from their brethren-in-tribe. Moreover, they were told by their master (peace be upon him) that neither any tribal affiliation nor worldly riches nor any other token of respectability could do them any good. It is only in recognizing the Truth—revealed through Mohammad (peace be on him)—and in following it that a man’s salvation lies, and it is in this that a man’s worth consists. The natural result was that the unbelieving notables of the Quraysh were contemptuously regarded by the believers, in the words of the Quran, as “the frightened assess.” On the contrary, the Abyssinian Bilal, (for instance) being a believer, was regarded as a member of the “best community.”

After the Holy Prophet’s mission had continued for about nine years, the prospects of the spread of Islam among the Quraysh of

Mecca and even the people of Ta'if appeared quite bleak, but Yathrib seemed full of promise. In 620 some Yathribites came to 'Ukkaz fair and embraced Islam. Subsequently Islam spread among the Yathribites and on their invitation the Holy Prophet graced them by emigrating to it in 622. With full control of the affairs he set out to put into practice his ideas of reform, and to build up a community in accordance with his ideals.

The first noteworthy event that took place in Medina was the formal "fraternization" (*muwakhah*) of the Meccan *Emigrants* (*muhajirun*) and the Medinian "helpers" (*Ansar*). The emigrants who thus became the brothers of the "helpers" shared their properties with them and even had a share in their inheritance until this practice was revoked by the Quran.

Besides "fraternization", the Holy Prophet drew up what may be termed a constitution for the state of Medina in the first year of the Hijrah.¹ This document, according to Nicholson, was ostensibly "a cautious and tactful reform" (but) "it was in reality a revolution." Muhammad, writes Nicholson, durst not strike at the independence of the tribes, but he destroyed it, in effect, by shifting the centre of power from the tribe to the community.² The following points are noteworthy in that constitution:

First, that the 'believers' and those Jews who were their allies for common defence, constituted an *ummah* (a political community) distinct from the rest of the world. However, this unity of Jews and Muslims was based on specific terms and conditions on which the two parties—the believers and those Jewish tribes. "who follow them and are attached to them and crusade along with them"—had agreed as their terms of confederation.

Second, that the separate entity of believers as a community of faith, transcending the tribal affiliations of the individual believers,

1. For the text of this constitution see *Ibn Hisham*, Vol. II, pp. 147-151. See its English translation in Watt, *Muhammad at Medina*, *op. cit.*, pp. 221-225, and its Urdu translation in Muhammad Hamidullah, *'Ahd-i-Nabawi ka Nizam-i-Hukmrani*, Hyderabad, n.d., pp. 102-111.
2. R.A. Nicholson, *A Literary History of the Arabs*, Cambridge, 1953, p. 173.

was clearly recognized. The believers were not allowed to forsake any debtor among them; the peace of the believers is one; in case of any loss of believers' blood in the way of God all the believers would take revenge; no believer could confederate with the client of another believer.¹

Thirdly, though the Muslims were divided internally into separate tribal affiliations, yet unlike the former times, these tribes were not independent and sovereign political entities. They are rather merely administrative units. As administrative units they remained and discharged some useful administrative functions. They still had a degree of autonomy and were responsible with regard to their internal affairs, with regard to matters pertaining to their own 'quarters'. The payment of blood-money and the ransoming of their captives, according to the provision of the constitution, were to be made jointly by the members of a clan as in former times.² But gone was their former position as the focus of supreme loyalty. The tribes remained, but the particularism, and the chauvinistic attachment to them that would stand in the way of subordinating this tribal association to any other higher consideration, were destroyed.

Besides these events which influenced the development of the Muslim *ummah*, the teachings of the Prophet too played a very important part and we find a deep impress of them on the character of the *ummah* of the early Islamic period. Some of the teachings which have direct bearing on our subject were as follows:

1. The essential unity of mankind was emphasised by the Quran by pointing out the common ancestry of man.³ The Prophet himself also stressed this point time and again.
2. The notion of the inherent superiority of one tribe over another was denounced as "arrogance of the times of ignorance." There was no nobility inherent in blood. Real nobility

1. See clauses 3-11 of this constitution in *Hamidullah*, pp. 102 ff. See also *Ibn Hisham*, Vol. II, pp. 147-151.

2. *Hamidullah*, *op. cit.*

3. See for instance IV: 1-2, and XLIX: 10.

lay in piety and good conduct.

3. As a corollary to this, '*asabiyah*' was strongly denounced by the Prophet who said:

Whoever dies for '*asabiyah*' is not one of us.

Whoever calls towards '*asabiyah*' is not one of us.

Whoever fights for '*asabiyah*' is not one of us.

A companion of the Prophet once inquired of him the meaning of "*asabiyah*". "Is one's love of one's folk '*asabiyah*?' he inquired. "No", said the Prophet, '*asabiyah*' is to support one's folk in wrong-doing."

In the latter saying the Prophet clearly explains as to when the love of one's folk assumes objectionable proportions. Love of one's folk, however, is not condemnable in itself.

4. The concept of an ideological *ummah* was further elaborated. It was to be a community of people joined together for the sake of "enjoining right and forbidding indecency." This *ummah* would, therefore, naturally not remain confined to any particular country, race or linguistic group. All those who accepted Islam were to become members of this fraternity of faith,¹ and the protecting friends of one another.²

When Muhammad (peace be on him) breathed his last in 632, he had destroyed the basis of the *jahili* social organisation: the focus of loyalty had shifted from one's clan or tribe to Allah, and in social and political terms, to the *ummah* (community) of those who had surrendered themselves to Allah and had accepted His religion; in other words, to an *ummah* based on faith, and not on kinship.

To recapitulate: the tribal '*asabiyah*' was obliterated by the Prophet during his life-time. He, however, did not abolish the tribes as such. Instead, he created a supra-tribal community, a community which transcended but did not obliterate tribes. We have already seen in the constitution of Medina that some features of tribal organisation had

1. Quran LX:8

2. Quran IX:151

been left intact in the social organisation of the Muslim community. It seems that the Prophet had no objection against the survival of the tribes as units of administrative and economic significance. Later on, even during the days of Umar, the second caliph, we find that tribal and clan units served as military formations and their existence facilitated the drawing up of pay-rolls for the standing Muslim army.

Casting a glance at the history of Muslim *ummah* since its inception we find that throughout the fourteen subsequent centuries, Muslims have strongly clung to their belief in universal Islamic brotherhood, and the form of political organization which has been regarded by them as the ideal one was a Caliphate embracing the entire Muslim world. No doubt ever since the disintegration of the Umayyad Caliphate there has never been a time when the whole of the Muslim world has been united in the form of a single state and Muslim juristic thought too subsequently legitimized this development but with reluctance and on the plea of administrative difficulties.¹

But this unpleasant reality of political life did not have much of an effect on the way of thinking of the Muslims in general. They have always clung to the notion that the Muslims of the world constitute a separate *ummah* and one, indivisible brotherhood. This has prevented them from developing the notion that they belong to any community on racial, territorial or any other similar grounds. Despite the fragmentation of the Muslim world into more than one states, ruled separately by Muslim princes, a Muslim did not recognize any part of the *Dar al-Islam* as foreign territory. A Muslim could freely move about the length and breadth of the Islamic world and take employment and settle down wherever he liked. *Dar al-Islam*, despite its internal divisions due to dynastic interests, was culturally and spiritually one world as distinct from the world of unbelievers which was termed *Dar-al-Harb* (the abode of war).

1. See for instance, Al-Mawardi, *Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah*

(III)

In such a society, the idea of nationalism began to penetrate alongwith other ideas belonging to the modern European civilization. This process began with a perceptible degree of force in the nineteenth century when the Muslims began to awaken from their dream-world to find that a large part of the Muslim world had already fallen a prey to the domination of European colonial powers, and the rest was seriously menaced by the same threat.

It is in this situation, or rather as a reaction against it, that nationalism arose in the Muslim world. It was essentially the reaction of Muslims against the heart-breaking situation in which they found themselves—the European domination over the Muslim world. The gloomy state of affairs found in the Muslim world aroused love for national independence, and created the urge for the ejection of foreign control. The continuance of foreign dominance kept the flame of nationalist sentiments alive and provided a tangible purpose for which nationalist struggle could be waged.

In the Muslim world nationalism has, therefore, generally denoted the drive to get rid of alien control and dominance. It is nationalism in this sense that has been one of the most powerful driving forces in the contemporary world of Islam. It is nationalism in this sense which has found a ready and enthusiastic response from the broad masses of Muslims in all parts of the Muslim world. However, in course of time there has also developed a nationalist ideology which, in its content, is hardly distinguishable from any other nationalist ideology and seems to take no notice of the peculiar ideas and institutions which characterize the Muslim society. Adherence to this ideology is confined only to a small section of the westernized *elite* in the Muslim world. It is of great significance, nevertheless, because this *elite* commands a position of no mean importance in the affairs of the Muslim world.

The nationalist ideology (or merely the nationalist attitude of mind in many cases) of this *elite* is overridingly secular in its orientation

and is opposed to some of the most cherished socio-political ideals of the Muslims. For, these nationalists, following the trend of modern nationalist thought believe in nationality on non-religious grounds and hold that religion should be reduced to a private affair and should not be allowed to interfere with public affairs. Their ideal is to evolve a common nationality based on such factors as the sharing of a common fatherland, a common language, common historical memories, common material interests, etc. The importance of the role of religion as a nation-building factor is no doubt recognized by these nationalists, but merely as a historical incident. It is not seen as having any normative importance for the nation as a whole. Belief in the universal brotherhood of Islam is also frowned upon either for fear of driving a wedge within the ranks of the nation all of whose members are not Muslims, even though a predominant majority might be Muslim (as for instance, the Arab and Indonesian nationalists say) or for fear of obscuring the peculiarities which go to make that nation a distinct collective entity, distinct even from all other Muslim nations (as for instance, the Turkish nationalists say).

When Iqbal began to think and express himself on the problems of the Muslims and of his fellow-countrymen around the turn of the century, nationalism in the Muslim world was in its embryonic stage. It goes to the credit of Iqbal to have anticipated the trends which were bound to follow in the wake of the popularisation of nationalism in the Muslim world, and to have given them a clear guidance.

Except for a very brief period in his life, Iqbal pitted himself in opposition to nationalism. It is only in his first collection of poems, *Bang-i-Dira*, and only in a few poems of the first period (*i.e.* prior to 1905) that we see him in the garb of an ardent Indian nationalist. These poems eloquently speak of his love of the nationalist variety for the Indo-Pakistan subcontinent and its people. The fatherland occupies the central place in his mind and religion is mentioned as a divisive factor in the nation. Rather than religion, fatherland forms the centre of affection and loyalty. Instead of ordinary temples Iqbal

would like to erect a "new temple," the temple of his fatherland, India. Addressing the Brahmins of the country he says:

پتھر کی مورتوں کو سمجھنا ہے تو خدا ہے
خاک وِتن کا مجھ کو ہر ذرہ دیوتا ہے¹

(Thou seest deity in the images of stone,

For me there is deity in every particle of the country's dust.)

But this was a temporary and a very short-lived phase. Curiously enough, what generally leads to the weakening of faith in Islam of so many other people, led to a further strengthening of Iqbal's faith in Islam and developed in him resistance against alien ideologies. This was Iqbal's three-year stay in Europe (1905-1908). Here a good deal of change in his mental attitude came about. The fundamental change that occurred in him was his disenchantment with the western civilization. Besides that, in Europe, Iqbal had a full view of nationalism: its motives and its results. Here he saw how it had destroyed the idea of universal brotherhood; how it had created artificial barriers between man and man and between nation and nation; how it had sown seeds of international discord. Furthermore, he also became conscious of the dangerous possibilities of the idea of nationalism in the context of the Muslim world. He became sure that the spread of this idea was bound to divide the Muslim world and thus smooth the way for the realization of the designs of colonial powers. The fears of Iqbal were vindicated very soon when during the first world war a section of Muslims in the Arab world collaborated with the British against the Turks. For, nationalism had made them abandon their former line of thinking: that they should remain loyal to the Ottoman state because it was an Islamic Empire. The Ottoman state now appeared to many of the Arabs as detestable foreign domination. In this context what Iqbal himself says about the development of his views on the subject is noteworthy:

"...I have been repudiating the concept of nationalism since the time when it was not known in India and the Muslim world.

1. Iqbal, *Bang-i-Dira*, p. 88

At the very start it had become clear to me from the writings of European authors that the imperialistic designs of Europe were in great need of this effective weapon—the propagation of the European conception of nationalism in Muslim countries—to shatter the religious unity of Islam to pieces.”¹

It is essential to bear in mind at the very outset that Iqbal does not confuse between patriotism and nationalism. He draws a clear line of demarcation between the two and while he rejects nationalism, he has nothing but respect for patriotism, as we shall see shortly. Love of the fatherland or nation, far from being morally condemnable, is a sound, healthy and morally praiseworthy trait of character. What is objectionable is its exaggeration.

This trend of thought in Iqbal is based on the Islamic viewpoint in regard to all worldly attachments. It is not the worldly attachments themselves which are held by Islam as objectionable; it is their exaggeration which is disapproved. For instance, the urge to acquire worldly riches, and the instinct of self-love, allegiance to one's parents, one's wife and children, or one's kinsmen, none of these is bad in itself. On the contrary, all these are positively good and occupy important positions in the Islamic hierarchy of values. But these very things become “*fitnah*” according to Islam, if they make us forget our Creator, or the next world, or our obligations towards our Creator.²

Iqbal makes this point clear again and again by stressing that his opposition to nationalism should not be misconstrued as opposition to patriotism:

Nationalism in the sense of one's love of one's country and even readiness to die for its honour is a part of Muslim's faith³

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1. Iqbal, *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, ed. “Shāmlū”, second edition, Lahore, 1948, p. 224.
 2. Cf. Quran, *passim*
 3. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 141. Cf. *Ibid.*, p. 225, also p. 38. “Patriotism is a perfectly natural virtue and has a place in the moral life of man.”

But Iqbal is emphatic that nationalism as understood in the present times is very much different from patriotism which is held by Islam as a praiseworthy attribute. In one of his couplets, alluding to the reported saying of the Prophet that "love of one's homeland is part of faith," he points out:

ارشاد نبوت میں وطن اور ہی کچھ ہے
گفتار سیاست میں وطن اور ہی کچھ ہے¹

(Fatherland in political parlance denotes one thing,
in the Prophetic parlance, quite another).

A proper appreciation of Iqbal's attitude in regard to nationalism, therefore, makes it imperative to study what, in his view, constitutes the essence of modern nationalism.

Iqbal does not regard nationalism to be merely the result of a fortuitous combination of certain transient political circumstances. Its roots lie much deeper. They are to be found deep in the very nature of the teachings of Christianity and the peculiar course of Christian historical development. The ultimate seeds of nationalism are to be found in the doctrinal formulations of Christianity which have been characterized by complete other-worldliness, a negative attitude towards worldly life, and duality of spirit and matter. It is these aspects of Christianity which led to a bifurcation between spiritual and temporal affairs of life, to a separation between the church and the state, and reduced religion to a matter of private concern of individuals which has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life. "Primitive Christianity," says Iqbal, "was founded, not as a political or civil unit, but as a monastic order in a profane world. . ."² "renouncing the world of matter and fixing its gaze completely on the world of spirit,"³ and accepting uncritically "the duality of matter and spirit probably from Manichaeian thought."⁴ Such a purely other-worldly religion could not guide and regulate human life in

1. *Bang-i-Dira*, p. 174.

2. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 155.

3. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 8.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

its totality. To substantiate his point Iqbal quotes Naumann who observes:

“Primitive Christianity attached no value to the preservation of the state, law, organization, production. It simply does not reflect on the conditions of human society...

Hence we either dare to aim at being without a state, and thus throw ourselves into the arms of anarchy, or we decide to possess, alongside of our religious creed, a political creed as well.”¹

In fact Christianity was tried in quite an early state of its history by Constantine “as a system of unification. Its failure to work as such a system drove the Emperor Julian to the old gods of Rome.”² The result was that “state and church confronted each other as distinct powers with interminable boundary disputes between them.”³

The structure of Christianity as a universal system of ethics was rudely shaken by the Reformation initiated by Luther. Although the revolt of Luther was directed against the church organization, not against any system of polity of a secular nature, its consequences were very far-reaching. The consequences of this revolt were of ethical as well as political import. Eventually this revolt resulted in “the complete displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by the growth of a purely national and hence narrower systems of ethics.”⁴ Iqbal makes detailed observation on this point which explain his point of view in a fairly clear manner:

“... The upshot of the intellectual movement initiated by such men as Rousseau and Luther was the break-up of one into mutually ill-adjusted many, the transformation of a human into national outlook, requiring a more realistic foundation, such as the notion of country, and finding expression through

1. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 166.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 146.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 155.

4. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 5. Iqbal repeats this sentence over and over again in describing the ethical impact of nationalism.

varying systems of polity evolved on national lines, *i.e.*, on lines which recognize territory as the only principle of political solidarity. If you begin with the conception of religion as complete other-worldliness, then what has happened to Christianity is perfectly natural. The universal ethics of Jesus is displaced by national systems of ethics and polity. The conclusion to which Europe is consequently driven is that religion is a private affair of the individual and has nothing to do with what is called man's temporal life... [a development which has] resulted practically in the total exclusion of Christianity from the life of European states. The result is a set of mutually ill-adjusted states, dominated by interests not human but national. And these ill-adjusted states after trampling over the morals and convictions of Christianity are today feeling the need... of a unity which Christian church-organization originally gave them, but which, instead of reconstructing it in the light of Christ's mission of human brotherhood, they thought it fit to destroy under the inspiration of Luther.¹

In other words, nationalism is based on the idea that territory (rather than religion) is the sole principle of human solidarity, and this

1. *Ibid.*, pp. 5-6.

In his poetry too Iqbal refers to this development in Europe—the reduction of religion to a position of insignificance because of complete separation between religion and state. The effect of this development is that politics and statecraft are dominated by greed and avarice to such a degree that it appears as if a giant has been released from his chains! For instance, he says:

کلیسا کی بنیاد رہبانیت تھی سعاتی کہاں اس فقیری میں میری
 ہوئی دین و دولت میں جس دم جدائی ہو س کی امیری ہو س کی وزیری!
 (بال جبریل صفحہ ۱۶۰)

میری نگاہ میں ہے یہ سیاست لادیں کنیزاھرمن وودوں نہاد و مردہ ضمیر
 ہوئی ہے ترک کلیسا سے حاکمی آزاد فرنگیوں کی سیاست ہے دیو بے زنجیر
 (ضرب کلیم صفحہ ۱۵۴)

جلال پادشاہی ہو کہ جمہوری تماشا ہو
 جدا ہو دین سیاست سے تو رہ جاتی ہے چنگیزی— (ارمغان حجاز)

assumption is ultimately bound to displace the universal ethics propounded by Religion by a system of ethics based on the assumption that national interest is the supreme good, and the criterion of right and wrong. It is obvious that the growth of such a trend of thought will reduce religion to an extremely insignificant role in human society. Thus, it becomes clear that Iqbal's condemnation of nationalism is not a condemnation of love of the fatherland. It is a condemnation of the modern concept of nation and fatherland, the significance of which is not merely geographical. "It is", according to Iqbal, "rather a principle of human society",¹ which claims to be the only proper basis of cohesion and unity in human society and which exiles religion from playing a befitting role in human life.

This being briefly Iqbal's view of nationalism, let us make an attempt to discover the reasons underlying his opposition to nationalism. His reasons for opposing nationalism are Islamic as well as human. Such a statement in regard to Iqbal, however, should be made with considerable reserve and caution. For the Islamic and human aspects of his thought are inextricably woven, one into the other. In fact, the human consciousness of Iqbal is so profoundly imbued with Islam that it seems quite arbitrary to separate the Islamic and human aspects of his consciousness.² Nevertheless, one might hypothetically aver that even if Iqbal were not so deeply under the influence of his religion and culture, his human nature would still have risen in revolt against nationalism, although the virulence in his condemnation of nationalism undoubtedly springs from the realization that modern nationalism and Islam cannot go together hand in hand.

One of the reasons for Iqbal's opposition to nationalism lies in the fact that Iqbal has broad human sympathies and an outlook

1. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 225.

2. Mentioning that he has respect for the customs, laws and social institutions of other communities, Iqbal stresses: "Yet I love the communal group which is the source of my life and behaviour and which has formed me what I am by giving me its religion, its literature, its thought, its culture and thereby creating its whole post as a living operative factor in my present consciousness." *Ibid.*, p.11.

which is essentially human in its motivation and universal in its range. On the contrary, nationalism tends to narrow down human outlook, and fetters human sympathies. This is both degrading to mankind and is contrary to the higher purposes of life. This robs life of its sublimity as well as breadth. It cannot be over-stressed that for this breadth of outlook Iqbal is chiefly indebted to Islam. His broad outlook and his independence of the fetters of national narrow-mindedness have a deep impress of the universalist and human stress in Islamic teachings. Hence we find that, according to Iqbal, this breadth of outlook is reflected at its best in the *hijrah* (flight) of the Holy Prophet. Explaining the significance of universalism, which forms an important ingredient of Iqbal's thought, he expressed his vision of the ideal pattern of human life in terms of the *hijrah* in the beautiful lines:

Flight is the law that rules the Muslim's life,
And is a cause of his stability;
Its meaning is, to leap from shallowness,
To quit the dew, the ocean to subdue.
Transgress the bloom; the garden is thy goal;
The loss of less more vastly gain adorns.
The sun's great glory is in ranging free;
The skies' arena lies beneath his feet.
Be not a streamlet, seeking wealth from rain
Be boundless; quest no limit in the world.
The frowning sea was once a simple plain,
Played being shore, and liquefied of shame.
Have thou the will to master everything,
That thou mayest win dominion over all;
Plunge like a fish, and populate the sea;
Shake off the chains of too constricted space.
He who has burst from the dimensions' bonds
Ranges through all directions, like the sky.
The roses' scent by parting from the rose

Leaps far abroad, and through the garden's breadth
 Disseminates itself. Thou, who hast snatched
 One corner of the meadow for thine own,
 Like the poor nightingale art satisfied
 To serenade one rose. Be like the breeze;
 Cast off the burden of complacency
 From thy wide shoulders; in thy wide embrace
 Gather the garden.¹

In his Urdu couplets too he sings in the same tune of his universalist ideals. In one of the couplets, for instance, he finds the ideal of human life in the life of fish in the ocean—in its being absolutely free and unbounded by all artificial territorial limitations.

هو قيد مقامی تو نتیجہ ہے تباہی
 رہ بحر میں آزاد وطن صورت ماہی
 ہے ترک وطن سنت محبوب الہی
 دے تو بھی نبوت کے صداقت کی گواہی²

(Attachment to a piece of land leads to ruin.
 Live in the ocean, free from local attachments
 like a fish. Migration from homeland is the
 Sunnah of the Prophet; be a witness to the
 truth of the Prophethood.)

This boundlessness of Iqbal's human outlook, this refusal to allow human mind and human life to be fettered by the narrowness of outlook and attitude which stem from exaggerated sanctification of the boundaries of one's homeland, definitely range Iqbal in a profound opposition to nationalism. For nationalism has an inherent tendency to stress the particular and the parochial at the cost of the general and the universal.

Besides this cramping of human consciousness by narrowing the range of human sympathies, which characterizes nationalism, Iqbal also discovers in nationalism certain other fundamental

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1. *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, tr. A.J. Arberry, London, 1953, p. 31.
 2. *Bang-i-Dira*, Lahore, 1959, p. 174.

errors which go to make it a great scourge for mankind. The idea of nationalism is, in essence, an affirmation of the principle that blood-kinship is the proper basis of human unity. And blood relationship, as a principle of human unity, according to Iqbal, is "earth-rootedness."¹ This is a false principle in the eyes of Iqbal as it runs counter to the basic assumption of his thought that "life is spiritual in its origin."² And the boast of Iqbal is that the fundamental change brought about in man's outlook and culture by Islam, *inter alia*, is that it destroyed the "system of unification which were based on blood-relationship."³ Islam, says Iqbal with a profound sense of the superiority of Islam, seeks a purely psychological foundation of human unity, "not in the blood and bones but in the mind of man."⁴ In short, by stressing "blood-relationship" as the basis of human unification, nationalism de-spiritualizes and impoverishes human life, sinking it into the mire of "earth-rootedness."

Nationalism is considered by Iqbal a thoroughly materialistic, irreligious and anti-ethical doctrine. We have already seen that Iqbal seems to stress that the fact that in Europe religion declined, was reduced to the position of a private affair, and was deprived of exercising any influence on his temporal affairs during that very period of history when nationalism became powerful, is not without profound significance. In fact Iqbal discovers a causal relationship between these two developments. As a human being, Iqbal feels quite disconcerted at these developments. Even though he basically disagrees with Christianity, he is unhappy that the religious unity of Europe which was built by the Christian Church was destroyed by nationalism.⁵ After the failure of Christianity to serve as the basis of unity, Europe found this basis in the idea of nationality. "But what has been the end of that choice?" asks Iqbal. "The reformation of Luther, the period of unsound rationalism and separation—indeed war—between the principles of religion and state. Where did these

1&2. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 146

3. *Ibid.*, p. 147.

4. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 139.

5. *Cf. Ibid.*, p. 6.

forces drive Europe to? To irreligiousness, religious scepticism and economic conflicts.”¹ It led to the displacement of the universal ethics of Christianity by the systems of national ethics, a development which is not wholesome at all for mankind. “The result of this tendency we have seen with our own eyes in the great European War which, far from bringing any workable synthesis of the two opposing systems of ethics, has made the European scene still more intolerable.”²

The decline of religion in Europe has also brought about a fundamental change in ethical outlook. Instead of ethics based on religious teachings which gave mankind a set of definite, absolute moral principles, moral relativism is emerging as the ascendant trend of thought. In practical terms this means nothing else except unbridled worship of one’s individual or collective self-interest, the replacement of moral absolutes by the dictates of expediency. In the realm of politics and statecraft, this has provided an ethical basis for unprincipled opportunism. Since the idea of the supremacy of moral imperatives based on religion has weakened, there remains nothing to guide the nations today except considerations of material gain and loss. This has even led to the ethical justification of worst crimes on the plea that they are conducive to the interests of the nation.

This ethical relativism of modern times finds its most forceful expression in the political philosophy of Machiavelli, whose doctrines have had a revolutionary influence upon the character of the modern world—on its ethical conceptions as well as political behaviour. The essentially un-ethical attitude which, in the opinion of Iqbal, is imbedded in nationalism, is perhaps best explained by the fact that in his *Rumuz* he links up the development of nationalism with the political philosophy of Machiavelli:

———When atheism

First rent religion’s garment, there arrived

1. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

2. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 163.
Iqbal laments this development in Europe in his poetry as well.
See pp. 71 f. above.

That Satan's messenger, the Florentine¹
 Who worshipped falsehood, whose collyrium
 Shattered the sight of men. He wrote a scroll
 For Princes, and so scattered in our clay
 The seed of conflict; his fell genius
 Decamped to darkness, and his sword-like pen
 Struck Truth asunder. Carving images
 Like Azar was his trade; his fertile mind
 Conceived a new design; his novel faith
 Proclaimed the State the only worshipful;
 His thoughts the ignoble turned praiseworthy.
 So, when the feet of this adorable
 He kissed, the touchstone that he introduced
 To test the truth was Gain. His doctrine caused
 Falsehood to flourish, plotting stratagems
 Became an art.

.....Dark night he wrapped
 About the people's eyes; deception called,
 In his vocabulary, expediency.²

But perhaps a more important reason for Iqbal's adverse criticism of nationalism is that in his view nationalism does not fit into the ideological framework of Islam and is out of tune with the course of its historical development.

As we have seen earlier, Iqbal considers the rise of nationalism as a natural development in the context of Christianity: a view of its exaggerated other-worldliness, its duality of spirit and matter manifesting itself in the separation between the church and the state.³ In other words, the success of nationalism in Christendom is to be attributed to some of the basic weaknesses of Christianity. Since Islam is fundamentally at variance with Christianity, Iqbal is of the view that nationalism in its modern conception cannot (and should not) be assimilated by the Muslim society.

1. That is, Machiavelli.

2. *The Mysteries of Selflessness*, pp. 32-33.

3. Cf. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, pp. 5ff.

To elaborate, Iqbal considers Islam to be basically different from Christianity in so far as Islam (unlike Christianity) "does not bifurcate the unity of man into an irreconcilable duality of spirit and matter. In Islam God and the universe, spirit and matter, church and state, are organic to each other."¹

Closely related to the above is the fact that Islam does not signify merely a private relationship between man and his Creator; it is, rather, "an ethical ideal plus a certain kind of polity...a social structure regulated by a legal system and animated by a specific ethical ideal."² Iqbal considers the religious ideal of Islam to be organically related to the social order which it seeks to create. Iqbal is so emphatic on this issue that for him the rejection of one will eventually involve the rejection of the other.³

Besides these characteristic attitudes of Islam is the peculiar historical development of Islam. In harmony with its afore-mentioned characteristics, Islam did not appear as a monastic order in a profane world. On the contrary it has been a civil society from the very beginning,⁴ fully concerned with man's life in its totality. It is because of this—Islam's interest in man's temporal life and its positive concern for building a healthy social order in accord with its religious ideal—that throughout its history Islam has furnished those basic emotions and loyalties which gradually unify scattered individuals into a well-defined people. Hence the inner unity of the Islamic society, in Iqbal's view, is solely due to the laws and institutions attached with the culture of Islam.⁵

Thus, Islam is itself a principle of solidarity and provides a basis of social cohesion. It cannot, therefore, allow its principle of solidarity to be subverted by the intrusion of an altogether different principle of solidarity.⁶

1. *Ibid.*, p. 5.

2. *Ibid.*, pp. 3-4.

3. *Ibid.*, pp. 8-9.

4. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 155.

5. See *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 4.

6. *Cf. ibid.*, p. 9.

But Iqbal does not merely say that modern nationalism *cannot* be assimilated by Islam. The underlying current of his writings also is that modern nationalism *should not* be assimilated by Islam. The main reasons by Iqbal against the acceptance of modern nationalism are briefly as follows:

1. Nationalism essentially rests on the separation between church and state. Such a separation is peculiar to Christianity and is completely unknown to Islam. In fact it is incongruous with Islam. For this separation would also lead to an indifference towards the social order of Islam which would have catastrophic consequences. It would subject Islam to the same miserable fate that Christianity has suffered in Europe: its being deprived of exercising any influence on the temporal life of man.
2. In Nationalism Iqbal sees "the germs of atheistic materialism which I look upon as the greatest danger to modern humanity."¹ He considers it out-and-out irreligious, for the growth of a nationhood (on territorial or racial, or any similar basis) is possible only when accompanied with indifference towards religion.² For, says Iqbal:

...if such a nation comprises different religions and communities, the communities generally die away and the only common factor that remains in the individuals of the nation is irreligiousness.³

Iqbal also argues that one of the dangers of nationalism is that it gives birth to the conception of the relativity of religions. Too much of a stress that each nation has its own peculiarities lands people into the erroneous conception that "the religion of a land belongs to that land alone and does not suit the temperaments of other nations."⁴

1. *Speeches and Writings of Iqbal*, p. 38.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 227.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 238. It is obvious that Iqbal who staunchly believed in the universal validity of Islam could not tolerate this trend of thought.

3. Islam seeks the realization of human brotherhood. Its purpose is "to unite and organize mankind despite all its natural distinctions." According to Iqbal the requisite harmony among the nations of the world can be brought about by Islam alone. And the world today finds itself in such a perilous situation that either it will put an end to the artificial barriers which divide the nations of the world or be destroyed by intermittent warfare.¹

Nationalism seeks to defeat this noble object by emphasizing and perpetuating the differences between nation and nation, country and country, race and race. "From nationalism", says Iqbal, "thoughts naturally move towards the idea that mankind has been so harply divided into nations that it is impossible to bring about unity between them."²

4. And above all, Iqbal believes that the idea of nationalism militates against the Islamic principle of solidarity. Iqbal is emphatic that "in its principles of human association Islam admits of no *modus vivendi* and is not prepared to compromise with any other law regulating human society."³

Iqbal is emphatic that Islam, taken as a "law regulating human society", has a peculiar composition;⁴ the bond around which it seeks to organize human society is not community of fatherland, or of race, or of language.⁵ Iqbal stresses that since Islam is the bond of unity among Muslims, Muslims have no other nationality and fatherland except that of Islam,⁶ despite differences of country, race, language,

1. Cf. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, pp. 139-140.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 237.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 225.

اپنی ملت پر قیاس اقوام مغرب سے نہ کر خاص ہے ترکیب میں قوم رسول ہاشمی
ان کی جمعیت کا ہے ملک وطن پر انحصار قوت مذہب سے مستحکم ہے جمعیت تیری⁴

بنا ہمارے حصار ملت کی اتحاد وطن نہیں ہے⁵

اسلام ترا دیس ہے تو مصطفوی ہے⁶

etc. Emphasising that Muslims should be identified with their religion, and not with any country, he says:

Our Essence is not bound to any Place
 The vigour of our wine is not contained
 In any bowl; Chinese and Indian
 Alike the sherd that constitutes one jar,
 Turkish and Syrian alike the clay
 Forming our body, neither is our heart
 Of India, or Syria, or Rum,
 Nor any fatherland do we profess
 Except Islam.¹
 Thou art a Muslim; do not bind thy heart
 To any clime, nor lose thyself within
 This world dimensionate. The Muslim true
 Is not contained in any land on earth;
 Syria and Rum are lost within his heart.²

Nationalism strikes at the very heart of this kind of brotherhood which Iqbal envisages by regarding country, race, language, etc., as the bases of unification.³ For the obvious result of this principle is to drive a wedge between Muslims and Muslims, making Muslims of one land or race foreign to the Muslims of other lands and races.

(IV)

The foregoing discussion gives a more or less clear idea of the nature and motivation of Iqbal's opposition to nationalism. His belief in the innate unity of mankind, his belief in the solidarity of the Muslim community which transcends national distinctions, his profound detestation of the duality of church and religion (which, in Iqbal's view, is a pre-requisite of nationalism)—all these place him in a position of fundamental conflict with nationalism. But

1. *Mysteries of Selflessness*, p. 29.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 30

قومیت اسلام کی جڑ کٹی ہے اس سے ³

what does that mean in terms of Iqbal's own vision of Muslim polity? Does he stand for a complete merger of Muslim nations into a single Islamic state embracing all Muslim countries?

There is no doubt that at times Iqbal frowns even at the existence of 'nations' instead of an universal community embracing all the sons of Adam. In his small poem entitled "Mecca and Geneva", he expresses doubt regarding the usefulness of the League of Nations on the plea that it rests on the idea of uniting 'nations' instead of humanity. The message of Mecca to a world torn by strife between nations is to attack the problem by trying to unify humankind.

اس دور میں اقوام کی صحبت بھی ہوئی عام
پوشیدہ نگاہوں سے ہوئی وحدت آدم
تفریق ملل حکمت افرنگ کا مقصود
اسلام کا مقصود فقط وحدت آدم
مکہ نے دیا خاک جنیوا کو یہ پیغام
جمعیت اقوام کہ جمعیت آدم¹

(The association of nations has become common these days; but the unity of mankind remains hidden from human eyes. The disruption of human communities is the object of Frankish statesmanship; the object of Islam is the unity of man. Mecca gives this message to Geneva: a League of Nations or a League of human beings?)

But this should not be taken very literally. In his prose writings Iqbal displays much greater regard for the realities of life, particularly of the present-day conditions. He shows full readiness to tolerate a considerable degree of variety within the framework of the profound unity which Islam creates among its various peoples. The Qur'an itself does not completely deny the existence of such factors as language, colour, etc. in human life. Nor does it deny that these factors have some effect upon human life. On the contrary the Holy

1. *Zarb-i-Kaleem*, p. 54.

Quran considers these distinctions to be signs of God:

أَنَّ فِي اخْتِلَافِ الْوَانِكُمْ وَالسَّتِكُمْ لَايَاتٍ لَّأُولِي الْإِلْبَابِ

“Verily in the difference of your colours and languages
there are signs for those who possess wisdom.”

Iqbal quotes a well-known Qur’anic verse to support the view that despite the enormously significant deracializing role of Islam, it is not totally opposed to ‘race’:¹

“Verily we have made you into tribes and sub-tribes so
that you may be identified; but the best among you in
the eye of God is he who is purest in life.”

His opinion is that although “Islam looks askance at the nature’s race-building plans and creates, by means of its peculiar institutions an outlook which would counteract the race-building forces of nature”,² it does not contest the stark reality that there do exist different races, languages, countries, etc. and that this difference has its effects on human affairs. Islam does not seek to destroy the existence of these distinctions; it merely seeks to prevent them from becoming harmful. The method that Islam employs, according to Iqbal, to counteract the race-building process (or, for that matter, to counteract the operation of all those forces which tend to divide mankind) is “stooping to conquer without itself becoming a race-making factor.”³ In other words, Iqbal does not hold the opinion that divisions within mankind are not to be countenanced at all. His viewpoint merely is that there are things even higher than one’s love for and obligations towards “the piece of earth with which the spirit of man happens to be temporarily associated.”⁴

In the context of Muslim society, Iqbal believes that its inherent unity and homegeneity owe themselves to uniform belief in the unity of God and the Finality of the Prophethood of Muhammad (peace be on him) supplemented by the “five well-known practices of

1. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 140.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 139.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 140.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 138.

Islam", which guarantee for a practically uniform spiritual atmosphere in the world of Islam.¹ This unity, according to Iqbal, also has a political significance. Iqbal does not envisage a state of affairs in which Muslim nations will remain completely unconcerned with each other's problems. There has to be some sort of a unity between them, some sort of a link to make them share each others fortune and misfortune. According to Iqbal, the ideal political form of this Muslim solidarity is "a world state".² But the question as to what form Muslim solidarity should assume is a question of secondary importance. What is of primary importance is the consciousness that all Muslims constitute basically one brotherhood and that if there are any divisions within them—Iqbal seems to say—they may be tolerated out of consideration for administrative convenience, or out of deference to the inherent diversity found in human life which has to be respected as a reality. Iqbal, therefore, does not rule out other alternatives in regard to the form of Muslim unity such as "a league of Muslim states, or of a number of independent states whose pacts and alliances are determined by purely economic and political considerations."³ In a mood of realism Iqbal is prepared even to recognize in the present situation that the true and living unity in the Muslim world could be "truly manifested in a multiplicity of free independent units whose racial rivalries are adjusted and harmonized by the unifying bond of common spiritual aspiration."⁴ And the reason for this conclusion is that Islam is not opposed to distinctions between mankind as long as these distinctions do not narrow man's outlook and approach. Says Iqbal:

"It seems to me that God is bringing home to us the truth that Islam is neither Nationalism nor Imperialism but a League of Nations which recognizes artificial boundaries and racial distinctions for facilities of

1. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

2. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

4. *The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam*, p. 159.

Iqbal and Nationalism

reference only, and not for restricting the social horizon of its members.¹

While discussing the doctrines of Turkish nationalists, Iqbal disagrees with their nationalist ideology which suggest a separation between church and state which is foreign to Islam, Iqbal nevertheless shows full awareness of the political situation of the contemporary Muslim world and evinces full readiness to effect a considerable degree of adjustment between his ideals and the realities of actual life. In the mid-1920's when the bulk of the Muslim world lay languishing under the yoke of European colonialism, an effective Muslim solidarity on the world plane was a difficult proposition. Hence the temporary course that he suggested to the Muslim world in that set of circumstances was the following:

For the present every Muslim nation must sink into her own deeper self, *temporarily* focus her vision on herself alone, until all are strong and powerful enough to form a living family of nations.²

The underlying argument is, if we may make use of a metaphor, that a strong chain requires all its links to be strong and firm. Unless these links are strong, the chain will remain a tenuous one. The solidarity of the Muslim nations can be strong and fruitful only if these nations unite after having developed into independent and strong nations.

To summarize: Iqbal believes ideally in a completely unified Muslim world, but is also quite prepared to countenance the existence of a multiplicity of Muslim states as long as these Muslim states do not lead to the restriction of the social horizon of the Muslims and provided they evolve some formula by which the claims of universal Islamic solidarity are fulfilled.

1. *Loc. cit.*

2. *Loc. cit.* Emphasis our own.

(V)

In the context of nationalism, the problem of minorities is of very serious importance. What position does Iqbal envisage for Muslim minorities in non-Islamic states and for the non-Muslim minorities in an Islamic state?

Here too Iqbal's position is radically different from that of the nationalists. The nationalist ideal has generally been to develop the heterogeneous religious and cultural elements found in a country into an uniform nation, by destroying heterogeneity. The nationalist blossom is always intolerant of the blooming of a hundred different flowers. An aggravation of this situation sometimes leads, as in several countries in the world today, to the insecurity of life, honour, and property of the minorities. True, this is in abnormal circumstances. But in normal circumstances when the minorities are not threatened by physical extermination, their culture is constantly threatened by destruction. For the majority has a tendency to employ all possible methods, crude as well as subtle, to put an end to the heterogeneity found in the national life. All this renders political freedom a painfully meaningless proposition for the minorities as they are perpetually haunted by the destruction of all that is cherished by a people—its religion, language, traditions, and culture.

On the contrary Islam, which is the fountainhead of Iqbal's inspiration, stands for what might be termed as cultural self-determination for all. Motivated by a genuine spirit of tolerance, Islam grants the non-Muslim communities living under the protection of Islamic Law, the fullest opportunity to live honourably and develop freely according to their genius.

In the context of India, Iqbal's attitude was inspired by the respect with which Islam looks at the existence of various collective entities. Hence unity in India should be sought, says Iqbal, "not in the negation but in the mutual harmony and co-operation of the many."¹ The crisis in Indian political life too had resulted because the majority was not possessed of the generosity to allow the mino-

1. *Speeches and Statements of Iqbal*, p. 9.

rities to live and develop in the manner they liked to live and develop. The following sentences of Iqbal illustrate his way of thinking:

Perhaps we suspect each other's intentions and inwardly aim at dominating each other. Perhaps in the higher interests of mutual co-operation, we cannot afford to part with the monopolies which circumstances have placed in our hands and conceal our egoism under the cloak of a nationalism, outwardly stimulating a large-hearted patriotism, but inwardly as narrow-minded as a caste or a tribe. Perhaps we are unwilling to recognize that *each group has a right to develop according to its own cultural traditions*.¹

Thus, the polity which Iqbal envisages is one in which the individualities of the various religious and cultural groups are fully respected. As for non-Muslims living under Islamic dispensation, Islam grants them full measure of freedom. It even goes so far as to allow non-Muslims to enforce their religious laws upon themselves, even though these laws might be in conflict with the laws of Islam.²

For Muslims living in non-Muslim states, Iqbal claims the same right: the right to full and free development on the lines of their own culture and tradition³ or as Iqbal has put it elsewhere, "self-determination as a cultural unit."⁴

This large-hearted reciprocity in recognizing each other's right to live according to our own tradition is the best guarantee of harmony and goodwill between Muslims and non-Muslims. Their separate cultural entities having been secured, they have a wide area of co-operation in the interest of the country upon whose well-being their own well-being depends.

(VI)

Iqbal came forward with these views about nationalism when the concept of an Indian (territorial) nationalism, (which looked disdainfully at Islam as a factor of discordance,) was on the ascendant.

1. *Ibid.*, p. 10. Italics our own.

2. *Cf. Ibid.*, pp. 14 f.

3. *Ibid.*, p. 11.

4. *Ibid.*, p. 142.

The safety of Islam in India, in the view of Iqbal, lay in rejecting this concept of nationalism and in striving for the centralization of Islam in India—an objective which subsequently became known as the “Pakistan” movement and became the national objective of Muslim India. Iqbal not only gave the Muslims of India this ideal but also laid down its intellectual foundations by elucidating and elaborating his concept of what might be designated as ideological nationalism. It is this aspect of Iqbal’s thought which was at the basis of Quaid-i-Azam Mohammad Ali Jinnah’s famous Two-Nation Theory, the ideological cornerstone of Pakistan movement. Thanks to Iqbal’s realization of the implications of modern nationalism, and his timely warning and guidance, the Muslims of this sub-continent at least were not seduced by this new-fangled deity which had been denounced Iqbal in these vigorous terms:

ان تازہ خداؤں میں بڑا سب سے وطن ہے
 جو پیرہن اس کا ہے وہ مذہب کا کفن ہے
 اقوام جہاں میں ہے رقابت تو اسی سے تسخیر ہے مقصود تجارت تو اسی سے
 خالی ہے صداقت سے تجارت تو اسی سے کمزور کا گھر ہوتا ہے غارت تو اسی سے
 اقوام میں مخلوق خدا بٹی ہے اس سے
 قومیت اسلام کی جڑ کٹی ہے اس سے¹

(Of these new deities, the biggest is the ‘fatherland’—the deity whose garment is the coffin of religion.

The rivalry of nations is due to this. The subjugation (of nations) through commerce is due to this. If politics is devoid of honesty, it is because of this; if the home of the weak is ruined, it is because of this. It is this which divides the creatures of God into nations; it is this which strikes at the root of the nationality of Islam).

It would be hardly any exaggeration to say that Iqbal has been the main vehicle in our times for a vigorous assertion of the Islamic concept of *ummah*. Iqbal has made a unique contribution to contem-

1. *Bang-i-Dira*, pp. 173-74.

porary Muslim thought by proudly and confidently rejecting nationalism as a counterfeit ideology and by inspiring confidence in the Muslims that the concept of an universal Islamic *ummah* is a much grander concept than that of nationalism. His contribution is also great in so far as he discussed the problem of nationalism on a level profounder than that of any other contemporary Muslim thinker with the result that the case of Iqbal against nationalism is not based merely on calculations of political gain and loss, but on the claim that nationalism is unsuited to the genius and temperament of Islam and that once it is allowed to take roots, it is bound to deprive religion of its rightful position in human life.

Iqbal's ideas gave the Muslims of India their national objective above twenty years ago. But if studied carefully, his ideas can still serve as beacon lights to the present-day Muslim world which, having won its independence, stands perplexed not sure whether to develop along the lines of modern nationalism or in the light of the Islamic doctrine of *ummah*.

RELIGION, IN THE LIGHT OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

MANZOOR AHMAD

(I)

Religion today is beset with great difficulties and has got to face many problems. The older ways of understanding and interpreting religion seem to have lost their hold on the modern man who, reared in the Scientific culture of our age as he is, has begun to doubt the validity of revelation as a source of knowledge. He needs something more certain and more in accord with the spirit of the age than the cut and dried formulae of the theologians as proofs for the postulates of religion.

The disbelief of the modern man, which he cannot help, is making him anxious. He desires to return to faith—a faith which can give peace and rest to his consciousness torn by doubt and perplexity. How can this faith be regenerated? Iqbal has attempted the task in his lectures on “*The Reconstruction of Religious Thought in Islam.*” But it is by no means a completed task, nor Iqbal meant it to be so. It is simply an initiation of a process which is to be continued along the lines he suggested, namely the reconstruction of religious thought on the basis of human experience, in place of the Aristotelian Law of Contradiction which the scholastics adopted.

(II)

Every attempt to reconstruct religious thought in this age has to face this problem: at present there are two kinds of attitudes towards religion which are diametrically opposed to each other. There are some persons who cling to the literal meaning of all religious assertions, and refuse every kind of philosophical approach to the problems of religion. There are others who totally refuse every proposition, or assertion about religious facts, branding them as “non-sensical.” The former attitude is that of the dogmatic theologians.

Their contention is that the content of religion is unique and discontinuous both with ordinary experience and knowledge, and with the conceptual framework of any philosophical system. Their argument is: "There is no identity between the use of the term God by religion and its use by a metaphysical interpreter. There is also no way to religious postulates, (God for example) through human experience".

The latter tendency is exhibited by those analytical philosophers according to whom religious utterances fall outside the cognitive significance.¹ Let us briefly examine the two cases.

The case of dogmatic theologians actually involves the denial of any rational way to God. This position is weak for several reasons. Firstly, no valid reason can be found for this type of agnosticism. It seems to be very strange and even nonsensical that though God has created us, and this world of ours, and demands obedience, yet He has not bestowed upon us any such faculty through which we can know Him. If such a contention is maintained then even the Divine guidance, revelation, the prophets and His messages through them, would remain alien to us as the doors to any knowledge of God are totally sealed, and our intellect has been declared inherently incapable of comprehending Him.

Secondly, we cannot consistently avoid the use of our reason or thought. There are so many concepts of religion which cannot be understood without applying the philosophical approach to the subject. Notwithstanding that the Quran has made a differentiation between the *mutashabihat* (متشابهات) and *mohkamamat* (محکمات), and the believers are required to look into the *mohkamamat* alone and not to indulge into the superfluous speculative conjectures into the meaning of the *mutashabihat*. But the difficulty is that these two classes of verses cannot be differentiated from each other without entering into an argument which involves that which is, by definition, unwarranted. Moreover the interpretation of (الراسخون في العلم)² as a

1. The use of the term "nonsensical" is ironically accepted by them.

2. See *al-Quran*, III: 7.

continuation of the same sentence is as plausible as any other interpretation.

Thirdly, even this agnostic attitude in its very act of rejection of all philosophy of religion admits its contradictory, and the theologians in the execution of his own project involves himself in philosophical thought and is dependent upon the same appeal to general experience which it is his aim to avoid.

The case of analytical philosophers who deny any 'significance' to religious propositions is no better than that of the theologians. The historical development of Logical Empiricism plainly shows that the basic 'meaning principle' upon which it rests cannot be justified without the employment of an argument that is circular in the vicious sense, or a persuasive appeal to the need for clarity, if we are to have any successful communication. The positivist's claim of the clarity of meaning is neither new nor can it win any favour for their particular attitudes towards metaphysical or religious problems. But the positivists actually go beyond this demand of the clarity of meaning. They make a **NORMATIVE** claim for their principle which cannot be directly supported. In so far as the rejection of religious discourse as meaningless is based upon the 'meaning criterion' of the positivists, the rejection must itself be rejected as dogmatic.

(III)

If the above two tendencies, which lead to the same result, are rejected and any extra-dogmatic or 'non-analytico-empirical' approach is admitted, the question would arise which of the approaches can satisfactorily and comprehensively deal with the religious phenomena. Is rationalism a suitable method for it? Let us examine its case briefly.

The approach of a rationalistic theory to knowledge of any kind is anti-empirical. It maintains that knowledge must be explained and grounded by those rational concepts and universal ideas which the mind uses in the process of knowing. These ideas are not fashioned by the individual nor they are gradually elaborated, by the

race to meet the need of a concrete situation. They are real in themselves and they are superior in the sense that experience presupposes them. They are *apriori* principles. By an *apriori* principle is meant a principle which is necessary if a specific class of experience in a given universe of discourse is possible. It is not absolutely necessary that any particular universe of discourse must be, but if either is or if any realm of ordered being is, there are certain principles without which it could not be at all.

Deny unity and there are no numbers, deny space or time and there is no world, deny obligation and there is no morality. Since each *apriori* is thus relative to a special realm, and lacks apodictic certainty some philosophers speak of it as an ideal. A cognitive ideal or *apriori* is thought of as presupposed by science, a religious ideal is presupposed by religion.

Thus it is to be presupposed, but can't be rationally comprehended, by this type of rationalistic philosophy. Kant's polemic is directed against any such attempt. For him thought and being are two separate entities and any attribute in thought is not necessarily a predicate of being also. "The real contains no more than the possible. A hundred real dollars do not contain a cent more than a hundred possible dollars." The realm of thought is thus incapable of reaching the Divine, because thought alone is no guarantee for its existence. Nor it can, due to its limitations, reach the reality or numena as such. The failure of the famous proofs of the existence of God is telling itself against this capacity of reason. The cosmological and ontological proofs possess no value whatsoever as they are related to the realm of thought alone and not of being.

Kant has suggested a refuge in practical reason which he thinks can safeguard religion against rationalistic onslaught. But if one does not want to be "practically reasonable" then every hope is destroyed. No sense of 'moral obligation' can convince a dissident nonbeliever to believe in God or in immortality. If one can refuse the cogency of the proofs, one can even refuse to be reasonable.

But the problem is not that one does not want to apply the "practical reason"; it is, that even after that, there is no hope to

know God or any other ultimate religious fact, as the doors of being are totally shut. The *apriorism* is too tight a system to allow one to peep to the numena. The gulf always remains between you and your God and you cannot fill it so far as you remain a human being.

(IV)

The ontological argument for the existence of God fails also because the link in between 're' and 'intellectu' has not been established, and moreover it presupposes unwarranted assumptions. To a very great extent the force of such arguments depends upon the meaning which one attaches to the term God. This has been very strikingly exhibited in the case of Spinoza who infers about God's existence from the idea of God as the source and sum of all perfections. But for Spinoza God or substance is the infinite and all inclusive whole within which fall the parallel differentiations of thought and extension as its corresponding aspects. On this construction of the term God His reality is inevitably involved in His idea. To say the essence of God involves his existence is quite true, provided one 'believes' in Spinoza. But this prejudges the whole question, and the proof becomes purely verbal. The same is true of so many other formulations of the ontological proof.

If we feel any force in this type of arguments at all the source of it lies somewhere else. In themselves, they are nothing but an artificial way in which men sought to justify to themselves a faith of the truth of which they felt sure on other grounds.

(V)

The pragmatists claim that they have discovered the ground on which these beliefs rest. The exact form and scope of a "philosophy of religion" after a pragmatic type is not yet clear, and perhaps would never be due to the very nature of the pragmatic principle. For it is so vague and elastic that it can be interpreted in a hundred ways. If we trust James' *Varieties of Religious Experience* as a typical example of pragmatic philosophy then the scholastic theology and the metaphysics of Divine attributes do not enter into the practical

religious life. They are therefore useless and as such untrue. The tendency of pragmatism, no doubt is to deal with religion through an empirical method, which tries to exhibit the implications of those values at work in the actual religious life of men. A speculative conception of God, for instance, which could not be related in a vital way to the needs and purposes of religious conduct would fail to commend itself to pragmatists. "By their fruits ye shall know them," has become a principle of criticism awakening in us a philosophic conscience to the simple need of fruitfulness and a moral effect as a voucher of truth.

But on deeper reflection we find that this idea of working value is not so simple as it appears to be at the first instance.

One can draw broad conclusions about the truth (or value) of religion by this method only when the evidence of history is sufficient. The difficulty in the case of a test of this kind is that the evidence remains incomplete and inexhaustive. There are certain religious beliefs which seemed to work well during certain periods of history and in particular social systems. Moreover history does not record clear cut and plain cases either of successes or of failures of a belief or a set of beliefs, but rather of partial success or successes here and partial failures there. To put forward the plea, that when a religious belief works it is true, when it ceases to work it becomes untrue, and if at some future time it again begins to work it again becomes true, is simply an absurd interpretation of history. The very idea of the temporal relativity of truth would make a belief insignificant enough that it would never become practicable, and hence never true. The religious ideas and beliefs work whenever they do so, for the very important factor that 'truth' has a universality and constancy.

Secondly every religion is a complex of beliefs and a knowledge of the workability of the religion as a whole cannot decide the specific growth of any one of these beliefs.

Moreover the difficulty arises when one particular belief is more helpful and more workable for one individual while others are not, or that a particular belief proves very valuable in one age and may lose its importance in another.

Iqbal Review

There is hardly any logical value in this idea of universality. No universal affirmative proposition can be simply converted. We cannot pass from "all that is true works" to "all that works is true". This fact can be vouchsafed even by our experience.

The force of this approach simply rests upon a basic intuition, that "if a theory has no consequences or bad ones, if it makes no difference to men, or makes undesirable differences, if it lowers the capacity of men to meet the stress of existence or diminishes the worth to them of what existence they have, such a theory is somehow false." The pragmatistic philosophy of religion is an unwarranted extension of this naive conviction. Pragmatism then, as a positive principle, has no value whatsoever. It is a simple will to believe and a pure adventure into the unknown future of which we can never be sure.

(VI)

Before passing on to Iqbal's approach to religion let us discuss another oft-repeated and significant attempt to understand religion. This is a certain type of mysticism, which is based upon the idea that religion is a personal relation of man and God and that God can be disclosed in personal experience of human beings. This experience opens for the individuals a bliss, which shuns from articulations. Hence those who have this vision cannot say what it is. They can assert only this much that *it is*, and nothing more. But even the *is-ness* is a conceptual mode of expression, and hence this also cannot be affirmed of the being which they know. In the words of Tao-teh-King:

"One who knows does not talk
One who talks does not know
Therefore the Sage keeps his mouth shut and
his sense gates closed . . ."

and:

"The holy man abides by non-assertion in his affairs
and conveys by silence his intuitions."

Now this type of mysticism which abhors any articulation can

render but little service to the cause of understanding religion. The incommunicability of such experiences makes any discourse impossible. The results of this approach towards understanding religion if accepted would be tantamount to those of the orthodox dogmatics and could be subject to the same criticisms.

Though the truth on which this type of mysticism is based is indisputable, namely that religious truths are immediately known, yet the assertion that this immediate knowledge is necessarily incommunicable, is unwarranted. There is no basic difference between an everyday experience and a mystic experience, as such. Every experience has its two sides *i.e.*, thought and intuition. The more intensive experiences have thought implicit in them, while in every rational judgment intuition is implicit. There is no basic contradiction between the two. The difficulty arises only when the one is singled out as a criterion at the cost of the other. Rationalism, and mysticism have both been victims of this exaggeration.

In fact the highest type of intuition is one which has the greatest possibilities of articulation. In its inward movement it remains intuition while in its outward thrust it expresses itself into a system. The higher and the more profound the intuition is more complete and perfect the system would be. This is the type of intuition which Iqbal names as religious experience and makes it the basis of religion. The possibility of religion as well as its force and meaning depend upon the possibility of having such an experience.

That this type of experience is possible cannot be doubted. There is nothing strange or illogical about it. We can only know God, and we do know Him, through such an immediate, yet communicable experience, though the degree of communicability may differ in various cases. The intellectual formulations of the existence of God, and the confidence in its pragmatic worth, are all rooted in such experience.

This experience differs from the classical empiricism in as much as it admits that it is not limited to the clear cut and simple deliverances of the five senses and that it is not a passive affair. Moreover

it is possessed of an intensive quality. This quality on the one hand means the whole range of comprehensive qualities describing what the moral and aesthetic aspect of experience is for a self, and on the other hand the manner in which the self takes these experiences. It amounts to the total reaction of the self to the world encountered and to the vicissitudes of its own self as an adventure in the world.

An analysis of this experience would reveal that religion is immediately and innately given, and that a religious experience is a universal experience. On the basis of such an experience a philosophy and a system can be constructed which will have all the vigour of rationalism, and a confidence of its truth and workability. That such experience is universal, does not necessitate that every man should have such an experience, or must recognize it as such. Neither it is a special kind of experience granted to a selected few. It is just like any other experience and has something universal in it, in the sense in which the experience of gravity is a universal experience of mankind, although there are many who do not understand what it is when they experience it. And when its full significance is grasped by the scientists there emerges a specifically scientific experience of gravity which carries with it a special insight into the meaning of everyday experience.

(VII)

Let us now examine this experience at some length. The term 'Religious Experience' has been used in the literature of the philosophy of religion in a wide range of meaning. It may mean 'the Experience of God,' or 'an existent Omniscient and Omnipotent Being which is directly known through intuition or through any other kind of experience whether mystic or religious.' It has also been used for the experience which is claimed by the person who enjoys it to be the experience of God or a Being, though we do not assume the validity of its claim. The term might also refer to an experience which is connected in such a way with the thought of God as to warrant its being called religious, even though the claim is not made, that it is the experience of Divine Being or Reality Itself.

There can be yet another meaning of the term Religious Experience: that is an experience possessing of certain qualities in virtue of which the experience can be called (as some people insist to call it) religious, even though it is not directly connected with the thought of God. For instance a sense of sublimity when enjoying a mountain scene, or a sense of awe in the midst of ocean etc. can be classed under this category.

Our purpose to classify the meaning of Religious Experience is to find out whether anyone or more of the above categories of experience can give us an adequate ground to believe in God, and whether anyone of them can establish a faith in Him. The adequacy of religious experience for the purpose mentioned above can be exhibited when it is shown, that the religious experience either increases the knowledge of reality or it provide grounds for saying that there is a Being of such a nature that it is proper to call this Being 'God.'

But before we discuss the grounds let us look into a possible objection which can be levelled by the empiricist against the adequacy of religious experience. It can be said that the evidence afforded by religious experience can well have a meaning to the person enjoying the experience, but it can claim no validity outside that circle, or for a person who does not enjoy it. It is said, "That certain experiences occur which are grouped under the heading of religious experience *is an empirical fact*. And there seems to me to be no cogent reason why the *external observer* should not raise the question whether or not the occurrence of such experiences affords at least probable evidence of the existence of a Being other than the experiencer, other finite selves and the material world."¹ Now it can be answered in a dialectical fashion by saying—"that we cannot raise the question of God's "existence" outside religion and that "inside" religion, there is no sense in raising it." This answer may silence one, but can't satisfy him. It can further be said that as the man who already believes in the existence of God, religious exper-

1. Copleston, F.C. *Journal of Philosophy*, Vol. XXXI. No. 118, McMillan & Co. Ltd., London, p. 230. (Emphasis mine).

ience can, undoubtedly give strength to his belief, because it provides what is demanded by an attitude of psychological preparedness and expectancy. God is there in such an experience, not because He is *found*, but because He is already there. But for a man who remains 'outside' of a religion, and who wants a proof for the existence of God, in the empirical sense such experiences have no meaning. Whether for a man, who totally refuses the existences of God, or tries to maintain an attitude of indifference towards His existence, it is justified to raise the question of the adequacy of religious experience to provide a ground for the belief of God, or not, is a question which we do not want to raise at present. We want to deal with the objection quoted above on the same empirical ground, on which it is made.

Now when it is said that 'religious experience is an *empirical* fact,' what is meant by such an assertion. The one meaning that can be attributed to the statement is, that religious experience is an empirical fact to the person who is enjoying the experience. But this can in no way satisfy the empiricist who perhaps wants to remain a neutral observer and wants that God be given as an empirical fact for him. But then the religious experience of others can't be called an "empirical fact" for him as he himself claims. Is it an empirical fact for him in the sense that it is in his observation that there are persons enjoying such an experience, and reporting it to be so, and he must take it to be an empirical fact in the same way as he takes the reports of scientific experience from a scientist, and believes them to be so? But then his demand, and objection to the adequacy of religious experience that it provides no ground to believe in God, fails as his attitude becomes inconsistent with the attitude he adopts towards scientific experience, or other mudane experiences where he accepts and adopts them, and makes judgments based upon the testimony of others. The only objection which now can be raised is, that judgments based upon such empirical experiences and the generalizations which are made thereafter, are of a probable nature and their certainty rests on that maximum probability which is never

achieved theoretically. Howsoever great the degree of probability may be, it would remain a probability. But the existence of God is a fact claimed to be certain. The idea of probability if applied, even to His existence, would jeopardise the purpose, and meaning, of the existence of God. Apart from being a purely academic and theoretical objection which has got nothing to do with the practical attitude of certainty which a man of science or of religion feels, it at least brings the so called outside empiricist nearer to the circle of insiders. At last it can bring him nearer to the possibility of finding God in human experience, because it is probable to find Him, on the basis of religious experience being an empirical fact. Hence the empiricist stands at the same place as that of a non-empirical intuitionist, expecting to find God in experience, on the evidence of others who have searched Him and found Him to be there.

(VIII)

Religious Experience is an emotional conative attitude (of course not without a cognitive element in it) towards the whole of being. It would remain groundless, and irrational unless a psychical life answering to it as its appropriate object really pervades and controls the universe, including the individual who feels it. This attitude is on the one hand towards the whole of being, and on the other is of the whole of the individual, thus guaranteeing full development of his entire personality, aesthetic, theoretical and practical at the same time. In spite of the differences of description due to particular cultural developments at various times and places all those who enjoy it, find it a ground, more than sufficient to believe in the reality of its object. Though they do admit that this ground cannot be translated in any formal argument, thus making it incommunicable to those who do not share it. But this admission does not make their claim in any way less rational, or doubtful. The incommunicability of this experience is simply due to the fact that it is essentially a matter of inarticulate feeling. But like all feelings it has a cognitive element in it. To borrow the words of Professor Hocking, it is an outward pushing, as an idea is outward reporting. No feeling is so blind as to have no

idea of its own object. A feeling without a direction is as impossible as an activity without a direction, and a direction implies some objective. The inarticulate feeling seeks to fulfil its destiny in an idea which in its turn tends to develop out of itself its own visible garment.

But besides the difficulties, that might be encountered, and the objections that might be raised on the plausibility of translating such experience in formal language, it is certain that it carries with it a conviction in proportion to its comprehensiveness, intensity, and persistency. It is not tantamount to say that the cogency of Religious Experience lies in this argument, 'that because human beings feel in a particular way hence there is God.' The cogency actually lies in the experience itself, and in its enjoyment must be sought the ground which has actually led mankind to believe in God.

For the sake of philosophic relevance of such experience we can ask whether there are good grounds for regarding the evidence provided by religious experience as fallacious? Does our reflective thinking consider such experience, impermissible, irrelevant or unfounded? If there are no such grounds, rather on the contrary if there are good reasons for regarding religious experience as a sort of *evidence* then its claim becomes unchallenged and there is no ground for rejecting it as invalid.

(IX)

Let us briefly examine the type of evidence supplied by religious experience. Obviously enough every enquiry in this connection would start from the self itself, and its knowledge. How do we obtain the knowledge of our own self. It is certain that self is neither known by acquaintance nor by inference. Acquaintance and memory are fused together in a very intimate and inseparable way to yield the knowledge of subjective states of mind. (And these subjective states alone and their association do not constitute the *self* that we know of). These subjective states are in no way an inference. They are known rather in immediate experience.

An awareness of self and its states is normally present throughout

ones' mental life. Yet it is only at a reflective stage that we start distinguishing a self as a subject, from the object, not belonging to self. In the beginning, at the perceptual level the self and body are not very much differentiated. The self and body are considered as making a whole which is different from not-self. In a way they are thought identical. But later on there starts a differentiation in the body itself. The heart, or head, are now being identified with self, while other body is included in not-self. Finally the self is distinguished from ones' own body as well as from other bodies.

But then if the individual knows himself only through his subjective states, in his immediate experience, the question would arise, "how he knows of other selves?" One answer to this question is that it is by inference that he obtains the knowledge of the existence of other selves, or other minds. For the sight of other bodies, and their expressive movements similar or analogous to our own, force us to the judgment that another self is there: a self whose movements, expressions are manifested, and through which the bodies of others are actuated. He takes them as embodied selves as his own. He hears a cry, for example very much analogous to the cry which he might have himself uttered in similar circumstances and having of the feeling which he might have had, at such time he infers the existence of another self with the same feeling. And so is the case with all other behaviour-patterns which he daily observes and behind which he posits a self for a plausible explanation of their movements.

A much more adequate way of the knowledge of other selves is suggested by Professor Royce. His criteria are not physical. He says, "Our fellows are known to be real because they are for each of us the endless treasury of more ideas....(They) furnish us with constantly needed supplement to our own fragmentary meaning."¹ This means that certain external objects move in a way which is distinctively and obtrusively relevant to our own life. To anything that appears in our life with the character of a *response*, we instinctively attribute outer personality.

1. Royce, *The World and the Individual*, pp. 15, 168-174.

But the position is logically the same. It is still an inference of an *other* based on analogy. The individual still remains primarily with his own self, and its subjective states without any direct references, or *actual experience* of a self beyond his own. This situation seems to turn towards solipsism. This would definitely be the case, if we start from the assumption of an individual and his states of consciousness only as an initial start. We would then remain inside a vicious circle, as howsoever we expand our consciousness, or self, it would never become capable to reach the other, which is outside. Even the question of other self would become irrelevant at all, because it is not the denial of it which is implicit in such a case. The question cannot at all be answered affirmatively or negatively, because it cannot be raised. For such a mind there would never come even a suspicion of the existence of an other mind. It would remain totally free from any such ideas.

Fortunately the case is quite different. We can't start from an assumption of a *self only*, without any reference to the other. On the contrary we constantly presuppose that there are other minds, and thus we are already prepared to look for the signs of their presence. It is our own self awareness which rather seems to be an inference from a physical existence other than our own as an indensible basis of our knowledge. It is the essential incompleteness of the finite individual on which the existence of the mind is based. We can take the analogy from physical sciences as well. The casual connection supplements the temporal sequence due to the essential incompleteness of its own. In the same way it is the involvement of other mind, without which any idea of self remains incomplete and inadequate.

(X)

The above argument is confirmed and supplemented by the actual development of knowledge as such. Because if there is no primary and universal ground for presuming the existence of a physical reality other than our own, then at the most only men and animals, by their peculiar obtruding behaviour would appear as embodying

selves. The analogy would break up as soon as it is extended to other parts of nature as then it would have no ground as such. But the facts point to the contrary. In all primitive cultures we find abundant proof, where psychical life is attributed to the forces of nature most lavishly. Natural phenomena are interpreted in terms of psychical forces, having a distinctive individual unity of their own analogous to that of our own embodied self. This sort of animism, though not so much crude and extensive even persists in the domain of philosophy and sciences. We hear Aristotle saying that a stone falls to the ground because *its natural place* is the centre of material universe which it *seeks*. We hear Newton talking about a *force*, which earth *exerts* on the bodies within its gravitational orbit. Even in modern times where anthropomorphism is considered to be very out of place we can't help talking in terms of "opposing forces" etc.

All this goes at length to show that apart from an implicit reference which is made to a psychical life other than ours (even when we are in an act of denying it), there are definite, positive grounds, primary as well as universal, which point to psychical life beyond the range of human and animal organisms.

If this be the case, the primary demand arising from the incompleteness of the self can alone prescribe what is required to satisfy it. As the demand thus created is due to the essential incompleteness of the self, it cannot be satisfied by the finite and incomplete individuals, or even by a group of them. It must reach for a Universal and Eternal self. It does so in Religious Experience.

BOOK REVIEWS

The Revolt Against Reason

Arnold Lunn is a famous english controvertialist. The writer of these lines was first introduced to him through his academic controversy with Professor J.B.S. Haldane, the famous scientist and biologist, on "*Science and the Supernatural*". Lunn has crossed swords with many leading writers of our times—for instance: Dr. C.E.M. Joad, Professor Haldane, Father Knox and Dr. Coulton—and has very ably defended religion against its modern critics. He is witty and learned (though deeply biased in favour of Roman Catholicism) and knows how to deal with the throbbing controversies of our age.

Lunn's basic contribution to religio-philosophic literature was his thought-provoking book *The Flight from Reason*. It appeared in the chaotic period of 'between the wars' and met a very good response from the intelligentsia. Now Lunn has revised the book, rather he has entirely re-written it, and has called it *The Revolt against Reason*. * The author suggests that he has changed the title because when the *Flight* was written the "attack upon reason was still camouflaged" but now with the advent of the behaviourists, the existentialists, the logical positivists and a host of other "ists", the flight has actually grown into an open revolt—hence the new theme and the new title: *The Revolt against Reason*.

Students of philosophy and history have heard a lot about the conflict between science and religion. Mr. Lunn has explored a new vista of conflict: *the conflict between science and atheism*. He shows that the dominant creed of the nineteenth century was absolute faith in the miraculous powers of science, its omnipotence. He christens this creed as "scientism". Scientism was based on the

*Arnold Lunn, *The Revolt against Reason*, Eyre & Spottiswoode, London, pp. 250, price:15s.

dogma that reality is conterminous with the physical world, and that faith in science is inconsistent with belief in a supernatural reality. This belief created a mental climate which abhorred religion and refused to admit spiritual phenomenon. Mr. Lunn shows with logic and reason that scientism offers no evidence in support of its beliefs. The dogma that 'the supernatural is an illusion' is unscientific and irrational. Scientism, he claims, does not lead to a preservation of science, it actually amounts to a perversion of it.

Lunn's thesis is that revolt against God (which in itself is an offspring of irrationalism) begets revolt against reason which ultimately leads to revolt against beauty and revolt against morals. His book is an authenticated record of these manifestations of irrationalism and is also a rejoinder to them. In the realm of science this irrationalism assumes the shape of scientism whose greatest manifestation is Darwinism. In politics it leads of Marxism and Anarchism. In philosophy and psychology it appears in the form of Logical Positivism and Behaviourism. In art it becomes Surrealism. Lunn throws light on all these illusions of the modern age and tries to expose their hollowness.

Materialism became the philosophy of the nineteenth century. It was claimed that matter alone was real and eternal and even mind was a derivation and a reflection of it. Lunn criticizes this creed and shows how new evidences from the sciences of physics, biology and psychology have knocked out the bottom of this claim. He says:

"The dominant superstition of the nineteenth century was the belief that materialism was the only creed consistent with the scientific outlook. Only a minority of old fashioned scientists remains loyal to this outlook. The change of climate is largely due to the cumulative results of psychical research in many fields, from materialisations to telepathy. It is becoming increasingly difficult to reconcile the assured results of psychical research with the materialistic creed."

The author also presents materials providing new evidences in his support.

Lunn also offers the interesting argument that if materialism be true, it deprives materialists of every claim to truth. He says:

"If materialism be true, ones' thoughts are the mere by-products of material processes uninfluenced by reason. Hence, if materialism be right, ones' thoughts are determined by irrational processes and therefore the thoughts which lead to the conclusion that materialism is right have no relation to reason."

One may snubb this as cold logic but the worth of the rebuttal cannot be brushed aside.

Marx has also been subjected to the same scathing criticism. "Now", writes Mr. Lunn, "if philosophy is the by-product of economics it is clear that no philosophy can give us a true picture of objective reality. Marxism, which was a by-product of the industrial revolution, has therefore, no more claim to permanent reality than the *Summa Theologia* which Marxists no doubt regard as a product of mediaval economics. If, then, the Marxist is correct, no philosophy can be true. If Marx was right, Marx was wrong." (p.186).

Most interesting parts of the book relate to Darwinism and materialistic evolution. Lunn devotes nearly one-fourth of the book to a thorough scrutiny of this dogma of the modern science. It is not possible to give even a very superficial summary of his arguments in the span of this short review. Lunn devotes one chapter to the historical evolution of the theory of Organic Evolution and Natural Selection. In the following chapter the theory has been expounded in a simple but exact manner. After an exposition of the theory, the author discusses the socio-intellectual reasons for the presentation of this specific explanation of the organic phenomena. He also makes the bold claim that Darwinism was never scientifically proved to be true. It is only a theory and not a fact. In support of his contention he presents evidence from Palaentology and Geology and extensively quotes leading scientists whose views might come to many as a shock. He quotes Driesch as asserting that "For men of clear intellect Darwinism has long been dead." Professor Bateson, in his Presidential Address to the British Association declared: "To

us Darwin no more speaks with philosophic authority." *Dictionnaire Encyclopedique de Sciences* affirms that "Darwinism is a fiction, a poetical accumulation of probabilities without proof and of attractive explanations without demonstrations." And French scientist Cuenot declares in his book *La Genese des Especes Animales* that: "It is pretty clear that we must wholly abandon the Darwinian hypothesis". The author also quotes Paul Lemoine, a scientist of world fame and a former Director of the National Museum of Natural History at Paris, who is the editor of the *Encyclopedia Francaise*, as saying in the volume of the encyclopaedia devoted to natural sciences, that: "The theory of evolution is impossible. In reality in spite of appearances nobody believes in it any more. Evolution is a sort of dogma in which the priests no longer believe but which they maintain for their people. It is necessary to say this in order that future generations may orientate their researches in another fashion." (p. 106). It must, however, be added by way of explanation, that the author is opposed to *materialistic evolution* and drives the winds off its sails.

The book contains discussions on a host of allied topics and the tone is no where apologetic—rather one may complain that at times it becomes too aggressive. Nevertheless, it has been penned with a confidence in the supremacy of religion and the religious approach and with the confidence that religion alone can save the world from the forces of destruction which have been unleashed by man's own creations. The author concludes the book with the significant observation that:

"In the final analysis Europe cannot be saved by material factors alone. Europe must recover her soul and not only her soul but her mind. If the anti-rationalists are not dethroned Europe will be lost. Europe must return to the Logos or perish, and the return to reason implies a return to God; for as Pascal insists, there are only two sorts of people whom one can call reasonable: those who serve God with all their heart because they know

Him, and those who search Him with all their heart because they know him not."

The author's assessment of Europe is correct and realistic. But his prescription is vague and sketchy. This reminds us of Iqbal who is very candid and edifying on this point. He says:

"Humanity needs three things today—a spiritual interpretation of the universe, spiritual emancipation of the individual, and basic principles of a universal import directing the evolution of human society on a spiritual basis...Believe me, Europe today is the greatest hindrance in the way of man's ethical advancement. The Muslim, on the other hand, is in possession of those ultimate ideas on the basis of a revelation which, speaking from the inmost depths of life, internalizes its own apparent externality. With him the spiritual basis of life is a matter of conviction for which even the least enlightened man among us can easily lay down his life; and in view of the basic idea of Islam that there can be no further revelation binding on man, we ought to be spiritually one of the most emancipated peoples on earth. Let the Muslim of today appreciate his position, reconstruct his social life in the light of ultimate principles and evolve, out of the hitherto partially revealed purpose of Islam, that spiritual democracy which is the ultimate aim of Islam."

In all fairness, however, it must be said that although the book is a valuable contribution to modern religio-philosophic literature, the reviewer had a feeling at certain places that the author, in his zeal to defend religion, has become a little too sentimental, with the result that the argument has, at such places, become hot-worded and unbalanced. The first six chapters of the book, devoted to a critique of Lutherianism, are rather superficial and biased and the book would, perhaps, have been much more valuable without them.

K. A.

The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation

Dr. Javid Iqbal, son of the 'great sage of the East, Iqbal, is a young budding Pakistani intellectual and his new book, *The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation*. * is a pointer to the fact that he has, in his own way, chosen to follow in the foot-prints of his great father. The book carries a foreword from the pen of the President of Pakistan, Field Marshal Mohammad Ayub Khan which is significant in many respects.

The President very rightly says that the basic question before the nation is: "how best to weld the people into unity and how to resolve the internal and external problems facing the country?" His view is:

"Man as an animal is moved by basic instincts for the preservation of life and the continuance of race, but as a thinking being, and above all, as a being conscious of his power of thinking, he has the power to control and modify his instincts. In addition, he has a great yearning for an ideology for which he will lay down his life and sacrifice his all more readily than for anything else. What it amounts to is then that the more noble and eternal an ideology, the better the individual and the people professing it. Their lives will be much more creative and richer with tremendous power of cohesion and resistance. Such a society can conceivably be bent but never broken: Such an ideology with us is obviously that of Islam."

Perhaps no better statement of the need and place of the Islamic ideology can be made. The President thinks that it was on the basis of this very ideology that "we fought for and got Pakistan", but, "having got it, we failed to order our lives in accordance with it." "The main reason is", he says, "that we have failed to define that ideology in a simple and understandable form." The President formulated some important questions about this ideology and

*Javid Iqbal, *The Ideology of Pakistan and its Implementation*, Sh. Ghulam Ali & Sons, Lahore, pp. 176, Price Rs. 7.50.

invited different scholars of Pakistan to apply their minds to them. Dr. Javid Iqbal's book is "the thesis produced in response to this invitation." The President commends the book as "a brilliant effort" which provides "a rational and enlightened approach to some very fundamental problems."

Dr. Javid Iqbal's book is divided into six chapters, each throwing light on some aspect of the Islamic ideology. He makes very cogent suggestions for the implementation of this ideology. The most significant aspect of the book is that it draws its inspiration from the Qur'an and the *Sunnah* and is an explanatory commentary on the thoughts of Iqbal. One may disagree with Dr. Javid Iqbal on a point here or on a suggestion there, but one who goes through the book cannot fail to be impressed by the sincerity of his approach and the clarity of his thoughts on the subject.

The first chapter entitled "Islam as a vital organ of the State" deals mainly with the problem of the functions of the state. It makes a reasoned plea for an Islamic state and exposes the fallacy of the stand of the secularists. He asserts that, "Christianity as a religion has nothing to do with the affairs of the world. Consequently, the state had to be founded on the principle of secularism. Islam, on the contrary, was from the very beginning, a civil society with laws, civil in their nature (though believed to be revealed in origin)... Thus the introduction of the principle of secularism in the world of Islam is uncalled for and unthinkable." (pp. 11-12).

Dr. Javid Iqbal makes some important suggestions to achieve the end of making Islam a vital organ of the state. He thinks that there should be a National Assembly to interpret the injunctions of Islam (p. 19) and the Supreme Court should have the authority to decide, after hearing the '*ulema*' and other experts, whether a law is in conformity with the Qur'an and the *sunnah* or not. (p. 20-21). He also pleads for the reform of the Muslim legal education, the revival of the institution of *Qaza*, the establishment of a Ministry of Religious Affairs, the organisation of the *Imams* in government service and nationalisation of wakfs.

The chapter is very well-written, excepting the title about which the reviewer wonders whether the State is to be a vital organ of Islam or Islam is to be a vital organ of the State!

The second chapter deals with "the duties of the state and those of the individual to the state." The author asserts that the primary duty of the state is to God: "It must preserve, protect and defend the Law of God" (p. 31). Then comes its duty to the people, for as Iqbal said, "the essence of *Tawheed* as a working idea is equality, solidarity and freedom". Dr. Javid tries to explain this point at great length. Other duties of the state he describes as (i) development of the Muslim fraternity; (ii) provision of facilities to Muslims to make them live according to Islam; (iii) defence and perpetuation of the territorial integrity of the country (iv) establishment of a democratic order based on *Shurai* (v) safeguard of the individual's liberty, (vi) protection of non-Muslims and (vii) fostering of a union of Muslim states.

About the duties of the individual his views may be summed up in three points *viz.*: (a) loyalty and allegiance to the state; (b) co-operation with the rulers in the discharge of their functions and (c) attempt to put them right if they are led astray.

The third chapter deals with Fundamental rights. It has been penned in a very candid way and is a forceful plea for freedom and religion. The chapter ends with this interesting note:

"It is only through guaranteeing the enforcement of the fundamental rights of each and every citizen that the Muslim community shall be enabled to retain the vision of a more perfect state, which it can endeavour to reach under the guidance of the Laws of God. The adoption of the symbols of the *Crescent* and the *Star* on the national flag represents this very aspiration of the Muslim community *i.e.* the State to achieve gradually (just as the crescent moon passing through its numerous phases, eventually achieves) perfection under the guidance of God's Law (symbolised on the national flag as the Guiding Star)." (p. 52).

This interpretation of the Crescent and the Star is not only interesting but also original and is a tribute to the imaginative faculties of the author.

Chapter four is devoted to the ways and means for the realisation of the ideal of solidarity. Briefly stated, the author suggests (i) maintenance and strengthening of the West Wing integration; (ii) establishment of a healthy equitable economy and (iii) reorientation of education to suit our genius and national needs. He also discusses the question of script and comes to the conclusion that instead of the roman script, the Arabic script should be adopted for both Urdu and Bengali. He lays exclusive emphasis upon the teaching of Islamic history and theology to foster solidarity among the people.

The next chapter deals with the question of the ideal citizen. The author is of the view, and rightly so, that "the ideal citizen of Pakistan, however, is the *Momin* i.e. any person who truly, sincerely, honestly and steadfastly believes in the God of Islam and everything which He enjoins." He dwells upon the qualities of the good citizen and makes special reference to religion, freedom, *faqr*, courage and creative activity. Dr. Javid has also given a rejoinder to a former Chief Judge of Pakistan who in a semi-judicial report made the naive assertion that there is no agreement among Muslims on the definition of 'Muslim', and *Momin*.

The last chapter deals with "Pakistan, Hinduism and Communism". In this chapter he outlines the historical genesis of Pakistan and the dangers which are posed to it from Hinduism and Communism.

There are certain points which are not fully intelligible. For instance, the author's suggestion for recruiting all *Imams* into government service and for the issue of licences to *ulema*. One cannot be sure that the implications of such a step from the moral, intellectual, political and social viewpoints will not be quite disturbing. There can be no difference of opinion as to the importance of the reorganisation of the mosques and the need for raising the social status of the *Imams*. But the remedy suggested is very doubtful.

The author's view that Iqbal was a liberal and kept up the torch lit by Sir Syed does not fully correspond with reality. Iqbal was not a liberal in the tradition of Sir Syed and Amir Ali. Iqbal was neither a liberal nor a conservative; his chief merit lies in the fact that he tried to strike a balance between the liberal and the conservative standpoints and to suggest the golden mean between the two.

There can also be a sincere difference of opinion regarding the author's suggestion about the creation of the seat of a *Shaikhul-Islam*.

There are a few omissions and errors in the book which need to be removed from the second edition. For instance:

- (a) *Wazaiif* has been translated as organ (p. 2). Perhaps a more correct translation would have been 'function'.
- (b) The verse of the Qur'an *innamul mo'minoon-a-ikhwa* has been translated as "only the faithful are brethern." A correct translation would have been "Verily the faithful are brethern."
- (c) At one place the author claims: "Within a decade or so after the death of the Prophet, Islam had not only been divided into hree treligio-political divisions (the *Shias*, the *Khwaraj* and the *Sunnis*) but stood on the verge of civil war" (p. 87). As a matter of fact the *Khwaraj* and the *Shia* appeared more than twenty three years after the demise of the Holy Prophet (peace be upon him).
- (d) The author believes that "the *Khwaraji* and *Mutazilli* jurists of earlier Islam (held) that the *Imamat* could be vested in a body of persons or an elected assembly." It is necessary to quote references in support of this view.
- (e) Transliteration is incorrect at many places.

Barring these few shortcomings the book is a success and a commendable contribution to the literature on Pakistan and its ideology.

K. A.

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29. "Bal-i-Jibreel" Translated by Dr. Annemarie Schimmel (German)
30. "The Place of God, Universe and Man in the Philosophic System of Iqbal" by Professor Jamila Khatoon .. (English)
31. "The Conception of the Perfect man in Iqbal" by Miss Hasienna Shaikh "
32. "Essays on Iqbal" by Various Authors "
33. "Bibliography of Iqbal" compiled by Khwaja Adbul Waheed "
34. "Iqbal's Legal Thought" by Khurshid Ahmad "
35. "Iqbal's Notes on Neitschze" by Sayyid Nazir A. Niyazi "

اقبال ریویو

مجلہ اقبال اکادمی پاکستان

جس کا مقصد ایسے مقالات پیش کرنا ہے جو اقبال کی زندگی، شاعری اور حکمت کے مطالعہ پر مشتمل ہوں، جو سیاسیات، اخلاقیات، تعلیم، تاریخ، معاشیات، فلسفہ، عمرانیات، نفسیات، ادب، فن، تقابلی مذہب اور اسلامیات وغیرہ پر اقبال کے افکار کی تشریح و توضیح کریں یا جو ان موضوعات کے متعلق ہوں جن میں اقبال کو دلچسپی تھی۔

بدل اشتراک

(چار شماروں کے لئے)

بیرونی ممالک				پاکستان
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		قیمت فی شمارہ		
۰ شلنگ	-	-	-	۲ روپیہ

مضامین برائے اشاعت ”مدیر اقبال ریویو

۸۴۔ پاکستان سیکریٹریٹ۔ کراچی“ کے پتہ پر ارسال فرمائیں۔

رجسٹرڈ نمبر ایس ۲۱۹۱



اقبال ریویو

مجلد اقبال اکادمی پاکستان

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